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CLASS ACTIONS, INDIVISIBILITY, AND RULE 23(B)(2) 
MAUREEN CARROLL 
ABSTRACT 
The federal class-action rule contains a provision, Rule 23(b)(2), that 
authorizes class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief for class-wide wrongs. The 
procedural needs of civil rights litigation motivated the adoption of the provision 
in 1966, and in the intervening years, it has played an important role in 
managing efforts to bring about systemic change. At the same time, courts have 
sometimes struggled to articulate what plaintiffs must show in order to invoke 
Rule 23(b)(2). A few years ago, the Supreme Court weighed in, stating that the 
key to this type of class action is the “indivisible” nature of the remedy the 
plaintiffs seek. 
Some defendants have encouraged federal courts to adopt an extremely 
restrictive version of indivisibility, which I term “endpoint indivisibility,” as a 
standard for applying Rule 23(b)(2). This Article argues that an endpoint 
indivisibility requirement would be fundamentally inconsistent with the 
historical models for Rule 23(b)(2). Moreover, such a requirement would have 
devastating effects on civil rights litigation. An alternative standard, which I 
term “root-cause indivisibility,” offers a better logical and historical fit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1966, civil rights plaintiffs gained a valuable tool in their fight against 
discriminatory policies and practices, and federal courts gained a valuable tool 
for managing cases seeking systemic change.1 The provision in question, Rule 
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes class certification 
when a defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to 
the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”2 The drafters of this provision 
designed it to address the procedural challenges that had recently arisen in 
desegregation litigation.3 
Decades later, a group of immigrants sought to invoke Rule 23(b)(2) in their 
lawsuit against the federal government.4 The immigrants had been detained, 
without bond hearings, for prolonged periods of time—more than six months, 
and in some cases years. They alleged that the government’s blanket refusal to 
 
1 See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 857-61 (2016) (describing 
civil rights origins of Rule 23(b)(2)); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation 
Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 678-81 
(2011). 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). All class actions must satisfy the prerequisites of numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, which are set forth in Rule 23(a). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition, each class action must meet the requirements of one of the 
subtypes set forth in Rule 23(b). See Carroll, supra note 1, at 852-53 (describing these 
subtypes). 
3 See Marcus, supra note 1, at 678-95 (describing desegregation litigation’s effect on 
origins of Rule 23(b)(2)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361 (2011) 
(noting that Rule 23(b)(2) “reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to racial 
segregation”). Professor Arthur Miller, who participated in the drafting of Rule 23(b)(2), 
recently explained that the provision was thought necessary because:  
[T]here was no confidence, at that point, that simply because Mrs. Brown got an 
injunction against discriminatory conduct that a school board or a venal employer would 
apply that decree to every other member of the affected group. You didn’t have 
[Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)] back then; you had mutuality of 
estoppel. So, to make sure that there really would be relief to the affected group and to 
forestall game playing in terms of extending the application of the decree, the (b)(2) was 
thought necessary. And there also was a recognition that if you put one parent up against 
the school board, or an organized political entity, it wouldn’t work because of the 
disparity in resources. 
Interview by Professor Samuel Issacharoff with Professor Arthur R. Miller, N.Y.U. at Ctr. on 
Civil Justice 2016 Fall Conference (Dec. 3, 2016), in RULE 23 @ 50: THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF RULE 23, N.Y.U. CTR. ON CIVIL JUSTICE 1, 5 (2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/ 
files/ICCVCJUS17.1-CCJ%20Rule%2023%4050%20Booklet%20Project_RELEASE.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VEP8-7STL]. 
4 As the district court put it, “hundreds of immigrants are held for years . . . without an 
individualized determination of their flight risk or danger to society. Without a bond hearing, 
this prolonged detention raises due process issues, considering the aliens do not have an 
opportunity to contest their detainment.” Rodriguez v. Holder, No. 07-cv-03239, 2011 WL 
13180220, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011). 
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provide such hearings violated their constitutional rights.5 Class treatment can 
have a significant effect on this type of case; without it, the case might become 
moot before the merits can be adjudicated, or the relief might be limited to a 
single immigrant detainee.6 At the direction of the Supreme Court7 (by way of 
the Ninth Circuit),8 the district court is now charged with considering whether 
the detainees’ constitutional claims are eligible for class treatment under Rule 
23(b)(2).9 
In particular, the Supreme Court has questioned whether “a single injunction 
or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class,” as 
the Court recently held Rule 23(b)(2) to require.10 But what does it mean for “a 
single injunction or declaratory judgment” to provide relief to the entire class? 
How can courts distinguish between injunctions or declaratory judgments that 
are truly “appropriate respecting the class as a whole,”11 as the text of Rule 
23(b)(2) requires, and those that provide impermissibly individualized relief?12 
 
5 See id. Initially, the plaintiffs argued that prolonged detention without a bond hearing 
violated federal statutes as well. The Supreme Court, however, rejected those statutory claims. 
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018) (holding that Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965 does not implicitly place six-month limit on detention or require 
periodic bond hearings). 
6 See Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims 
in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2027-39 (2015) (analyzing benefits of 
class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2), including protection against mootness and promotion of 
resolution as broad as challenged conduct). 
7 See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851 (“The Court of Appeals should also consider whether a 
Rule 23(b)(2) class action continues to be the appropriate vehicle for respondents’ 
claims . . . . ”). 
8 See Rodriguez v. Jennings, 887 F.3d 954, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2018) (directing parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing specified questions, including “whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class 
action continues to be the appropriate vehicle for petitioners’ claims in light of [Dukes]” and 
“whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class action litigated on common facts is an appropriate way to 
resolve petitioners’ claims”). I co-authored an amicus brief addressing these questions. See 
Brief of Amici Curiae Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and Federal Courts Professors in 
Support of Petitioners-Appellees, Rodriguez v. Jennings, 887 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 
13-56706). 
9 See Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 2018) (remanding with instructions 
to the district court to consider specified questions, including “whether the [Rule 23(b)(2)] 
class certified by the district court should remain certified for consideration of the 
constitutional issue and available class remedies”). 
10 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851-52 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 
360 (2011)); Alexandra D. Lahav, Maureen Carroll, David Marcus & Adam Zimmerman, 
Government Class Actions After Jennings v. Rodriguez, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (May 8, 2018), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/government-class-actions-after-jennings-v-rodriguez/ 
[https://perma.cc/6SCM-W77J]. 
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
12 Cf. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360 (“[Rule 23(b)(2)] does not authorize class certification when 
each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory 
judgment against the defendant.”). 
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And why, after more than a half century of judicial experience with Rule 
23(b)(2), do some courts find the answers to those questions unclear? The lack 
of clear guidance has hindered courts’ ability to reach consistent and principled 
decisions about class certification in cases involving education,13 foster care,14 
conditions of confinement,15 and other issues implicating the public interest.16 
Pockets of confusion about the Rule 23(b)(2) standard have been around for 
decades, but in 2011, the Supreme Court made things worse. In its decision in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,17 the Court used the term “indivisible” to 
describe the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).18 That term 
(“indivisible” or “indivisibility”) had never before appeared in a published 
federal opinion as a Rule 23(b)(2) requirement.19 Yet the portion of the Dukes 
 
13 Compare Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 485, 496 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(reversing certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class of students seeking injunctive relief for alleged 
violations of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “child find” requirement, and 
suggesting that child-find violations are never amenable to class treatment under Rule 
23(b)(2)), with DL v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (upholding 
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class of students seeking injunctive relief for alleged child-find 
violations). 
14 Compare M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2012) (reversing 
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking injunctive relief for alleged systemic deficiencies 
in Texas foster care system), with DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1194 
(10th Cir. 2010) (upholding certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking similar injunctive 
relief for alleged systemic deficiencies in Oklahoma foster care system). 
15 Compare Shook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597, 602, 605 (10th Cir. 
2008) (affirming denial of certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class of prisoners seeking injunction 
compelling defendants to “cease using restraints, pepper spray, and electroshock weapons 
(‘tasers’) against prisoners exhibiting signs of mental illness in circumstances that pose a 
substantial risk of harm to such prisoners” because “different injunctions would be required 
to establish the appropriate behavior towards different groups of class members”), with 
Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 687 (9th Cir. 2014) (criticizing Shook and upholding 
certification of Rule 23(b)(2) class of prisoners seeking injunction requiring defendants “to 
develop and implement, as soon as practical, a plan to eliminate the substantial risk of serious 
harm that prisoner Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class suffer due to Defendants’ 
inadequate medical, mental health, and dental care, and due to Defendants’ isolation 
policies”). 
16 Cf. David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 782 (2016) 
(arguing that public interest class action has entered “new, confused era”). By noting the lack 
of clear guidance, I don’t mean to suggest that the correct answers are always in doubt. To 
the contrary, one purpose of this Article is to demonstrate why many of those answers should 
be apparent. 
17 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
18 Id. at 360 (quoting Richard A. Nagereda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate 
Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
19 Pre-Dukes, at least one federal court had used the term “indivisible” in connection with 
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), rather than Rule 23(b)(2). See Markocki v. Old Republic 
Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 254 F.R.D. 242, 250 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (determining that “class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(1) is appropriate” because “each of Plaintiff’s causes of action seeks to 
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opinion that discusses indivisibility is only four paragraphs long,20 and the core 
passage consists of only four sentences.21 This brief discussion of indivisibility 
has done little to clarify the standard for certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class; indeed, 
it appears to have unsettled things further.22 
This Article does not aim to evaluate whether Dukes was correctly decided. 
Instead, it takes the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) as given, but 
underspecified—in a manner that some defendants are attempting to exploit. 
Consider Tinsley v. McKay,23 in which the plaintiff-children allege that 
Arizona’s maladministration of its foster care system has exposed them to 
serious risks of harm.24 The plaintiffs sought class certification under Rule 
23(b)(2), which would help to ensure that any system-wide problems receive a 
system-wide response.25 The district court certified the class, but on appeal, the 
state defendants have argued that Rule 23(b)(2) is not satisfied because the 
plaintiffs do not seek indivisible relief.26 In the defendants’ view, indivisibility 
 
enforce duties and obligations owed the proposed class members in a collective and 
indivisible fashion”). In addition, federal courts occasionally used the term in their analyses 
of other issues, distinct from class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), that arose in class action 
cases. See, e.g., Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1291 (10th Cir. 2008) (regarding nonparty 
preclusion); Finch v. N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs., 252 F.R.D. 192, 200 
n.79 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (regarding mootness doctrine). 
20 See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360-63. 
21 This core passage reads as follows: 
The key to the (b)(2) class is “the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory 
remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared 
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” In other words, Rule 
23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide 
relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each 
individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory 
judgment against the defendant. Similarly, it does not authorize class certification when 
each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages. 
Id. at 360-61 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 18, at 132). This passage draws on legal 
scholarship about indivisibility in class actions. Because much of that scholarship discusses 
indivisibility as a concept applicable to all of the mandatory subtypes, however, it has limited 
potential to illuminate what the Dukes opinion means for Rule 23(b)(2), specifically. See infra 
Part I (discussing history of concept of indivisibility). The mandatory subtypes are those set 
forth in Rule 23(b)(1)(A), Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and Rule 23(b)(2). The label reflects that the 
class action rule does not guarantee absent class members the right to opt out of classes 
certified under these provisions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (explicitly requiring class 
members be allowed to opt out from Rule 23(b)(3) classes but not from Rule 23(b)(1) or 
23(b)(2) classes). 
22 See infra Section I.B (discussing unresolved questions about indivisibility in Dukes). 
23 156 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (D. Ariz. 2015). 
24 Id. at 1026 (summarizing plaintiffs’ claims). 
25 See id. (describing plaintiffs’ arguments that experiences were caused by “structural and 
operational failures”). 
26 Appellants’ Joint Opening Brief at 47-54, Tinsley v. McKay, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (9th 
Cir. filed Apr. 30, 2018) (No. 17-17501). 
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“requires more than an alleged injury that can be remedied on a class-wide basis 
by an injunction. Rule 23(b)(2) applies to injuries that can only be remedied by 
a class-wide injunction . . . .”27 
Adopting this restrictive view of Rule 23(b)(2) would make structural 
injunctions all but impossible in a broad swath of cases, in which a defendant 
has obligations toward individuals but falls short of those obligations on a 
wholesale basis. While the outcome of the Arizona foster-care litigation remains 
to be seen,28 state defendants have made similar arguments in a range of other 
cases,29 and some of those defendants have succeeded. School districts have 
argued—and at least one court has accepted—that violations of the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act’s “child find” requirement cannot be addressed 
under Rule 23(b)(2).30 State prison systems have argued—and at least one court 
has accepted—that a facility’s excessive heat31 or extreme overcrowding32 
cannot be addressed under Rule 23(b)(2). State Medicaid agencies have 
argued—and at least one court has accepted—that a formal policy limiting 
services for persons with disabilities cannot be addressed under Rule 23(b)(2).33 
This Article responds to the push for an overly restrictive interpretation of 
Rule 23(b)(2), and to the need for a better understanding of what that provision 
does require, with three contributions. First, it offers a framework for 
understanding indivisibility, as the Supreme Court used that term in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Relying on the work of the late Professor Richard 
Nagareda, the Court in Dukes described indivisibility as “the notion that the 
conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the 
class members or as to none of them.”34 One version of indivisibility draws only 
 
27 Id. at 53. 
28 I co-authored an amicus brief in support of affirmance. Brief of Amici Curiae 
Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and Federal Courts Professors in Support of Appellees 
at i, Tinsley v. McKay, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. filed July 6, 2018) (No. 17-17501). 
29 See Marcus, supra note 16, at 831 (“[S]ome lawyers for state agency defendants have 
recommended an approach to Rule 23(b)(2) that would prohibit certification unless the 
plaintiffs can identify a classwide injunction that each member would be entitled to had she 
sued as an individual.” (citing Brief for the District of Columbia Appellants (Final Version) 
at 42-43, D.L. v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 11-7153))). 
30 See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
23(b)(2) class certification was inappropriate). But see DL v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 
713, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of 23(b)(2) class certification). 
31 See Yates v. Collier, 868 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s 
decision to grant plaintiffs’ motion to certify class). 
32 See Williams v. Jones, No. 9:14-cv-00787, 2014 WL 2155251, at *2 (D.S.C. May 22, 
2014) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to certify class). 
33 See Brief of Appellees at 20, Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-
2377) (arguing that, due to nature of claims, “relief would necessarily be unique for each class 
member”). 
34 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, supra 
note 18, at 132). 
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on the “can be enjoined” part of this definition. It amounts to a requirement that 
the defendant could not possibly change its behavior toward one class member 
without also changing it towards all others, and thus that a court could not 
possibly enjoin the conduct as to one class member without also halting it (or 
compelling it) as to all others. This Article refers to this version as “endpoint 
indivisibility.”35 A putative class of foster children asking the defendant to hire 
more caseworkers would satisfy an endpoint indivisibility requirement, because 
a defendant could not both hire and not hire a caseworker, and the expanded 
capacity would benefit all of the foster children at once.36 In contrast, a putative 
class of immigrants asking the defendant to provide each of them with bond 
hearings would not satisfy an endpoint indivisibility requirement, because a 
defendant could provide a hearing to a particular immigrant without 
simultaneously providing one to any of the others. 
Another version of indivisibility includes the “or declared unlawful” part of 
the definition quoted above.37 It amounts to a requirement that the challenged 
conduct could not be lawful as to one class member and unlawful as to others, 
and thus that the court could not declare the conduct unlawful as to one class 
member without also deeming it unlawful as to all others.38 This Article refers 
to this version as “root-cause indivisibility.”39 As with endpoint indivisibility, a 
root-cause indivisibility requirement would operate in tandem with the 
commonality requirement,40 which requires a common question of law or fact 
that has the same answer for every member of the class.41 In order to satisfy both 
commonality and root-cause indivisibility, therefore, the immigrant detainees 
discussed above would have to demonstrate that the government’s refusal to 
provide a bond hearing was either constitutional or unconstitutional as to all of 
the class members at once, and thus that a court could not declare the blanket 
denial of bond hearings unlawful as to one class member without simultaneously 
deeming it unlawful as to all of the others. 
This Article’s second contribution is to demonstrate that a root-cause 
indivisibility requirement makes sense for Rule 23(b)(2), but an endpoint 
 
35 See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing concept of endpoint indivisibility). 
36 In theory, a defendant could hire a dedicated caseworker for a single plaintiff-child—
prohibiting that caseworker from serving any other children, even as her colleagues labored 
under heavy caseloads. In practice, however, that approach is profoundly unlikely. 
37 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360. 
38 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class 
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 232 (2003) (“Properly conceived, mandatory class treatment 
proceeds from the recognition that it is not possible to ascertain the legality of the defendant’s 
conduct as to one affected claimant without necessarily doing so as to all others.”). 
39 See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing concept of root-cause indivisibility). 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
41 See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (“That common contention, moreover, must be of such a 
nature that it is capable of classwide resolution . . . .”). 
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indivisibility requirement does not.42 The analysis draws on the Court’s 
recognition in Dukes that, because of Rule 23’s equitable origins, those 
determining its meaning should look to “the historical models on which the Rule 
was based.”43 An endpoint indivisibility requirement would prevent class 
certification in cases that Rule 23(b)(2) has historically encompassed.44 In 
contrast, a root-cause indivisibility requirement meshes well with the language 
and history of Rule 23(b)(2).45 
A root-cause indivisibility requirement alone, however, would fail to screen 
out cases that do not seek the “final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief” that Rule 23(b)(2) contemplates.46 Some courts have imposed 
a “cohesiveness” requirement in an effort to accomplish that type of screening-
out.47 The cohesiveness requirement, however, is deeply flawed, and its goal 
could be better achieved through more direct means.48 The Article’s final 
contribution is thus to introduce a supplemental inquiry, to be applied along with 
root-cause indivisibility as a test for compliance with Rule 23(b)(2). This 
supplemental inquiry is rooted in the essential characteristics of “final injunctive 
relief” and “corresponding declaratory relief,” as those terms are used in the text 
of Rule 23.49 
Ultimately, it matters less that courts adopt root-cause indivisibility than that 
they do not adopt endpoint indivisibility as a Rule 23(b)(2) requirement. The 
latter has the potential to do great harm. When this Article discusses classic civil 
rights cases, it focuses mainly on the point that screening them out of Rule 
23(b)(2) would be inconsistent with their status as historical models for that 
 
42 This is not to say that endpoint indivisibility has no relevance to Rule 23. To the 
contrary, endpoint indivisibility can help to inform the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(A). See 
infra Section II.B.1 (discussing link between endpoint indivisibility and Rule 23(b)(1)(A)). 
43 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361 (first citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 
(1997); and then citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 841-45 (1999)). 
44 See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing historical models for Rule 23(b)(2)). 
45 See infra Section II.B.2 (explaining how root-cause indivisibility aligns with history of 
Rule 23(b)(2)). 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see infra Section II.C (providing example of damages-only case 
that would satisfy root-cause indivisibility requirement). An endpoint indivisibility 
requirement would not screen out such cases either. See infra Section II.B.1 (providing 
examples of damages-only cases that would satisfy endpoint indivisibility requirement). 
47 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 4:34 (5th ed. 2012) (“[One] function that the cohesiveness requirement serves for 
some courts is that it gauges whether the case is truly one for injunctive relief, not 
individualized monetary damages.”); see also Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for 
Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 701-02 (2014) (analyzing relationship between 
monetary relief and intra-class unity). 
48 See Bone, supra note 47, at 716 (“Cohesiveness limits the availability of the class action 
and does so in a crude way that correlates poorly with the values that the limits are supposed 
to serve.”). 
49 See infra Section III.A (discussing these characteristics). 
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provision.50 But it is also worth noting—and, I hope, uncontroversial—that those 
cases had tremendous social value. Adopting an endpoint indivisibility 
requirement for Rule 23(b)(2) would cause that value to be lost in current and 
future cases addressing important societal issues. As a society, we may be able 
to recognize that value only in retrospect; but, if we are to have the chance to do 
so, the next Brown v. Board of Education51 must be given a chance to exist. 
I. HISTORICIZING INDIVISIBILITY 
Although the term “indivisibility” was new to the federal courts at the time of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the term did 
not appear out of nowhere. Rather, the Court drew on the work of the late 
Professor Richard Nagareda52 and the other authors of the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation (the “ALI Principles”).53 This Part 
looks to that prior work to shed some light on the Court’s brief discussion of 
indivisibility in connection with Rule 23(b)(2). As explained below, the version 
of indivisibility set forth in the legal scholarship encompasses not only Rule 
23(b)(2), but the provisions of Rule 23(b)(1) as well.54 
A. Nagareda and the ALI Principles 
Nagareda first introduced the concept of remedial indivisibility in an article 
published in 2003.55 That article identified its “central focus” as “the distinction 
between situations in which class treatment may be mandated . . . and situations 
in which the court must afford class members the opportunity to opt out.”56 On 
one side of this line are the “mandatory” classes, which include not only those 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2), but also those certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
and Rule 23(b)(1)(B).57 On the other side of the line are opt-out class actions, 
 
50 See infra Section II.A (discussing civil rights cases identified as historical models for 
Rule 23(b)(2)). 
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
52 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349, 359 (2011) (citing Nagareda, 
supra note 18, at 131-32; Nagareda, supra note 38, at 176 n.110). 
53 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
54 Each class action must satisfy the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). In addition, each class action must fall 
within one of four subtypes set forth in Rule 23(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
55 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 175-181, 232. An earlier version of indivisibility had 
appeared previously as part of David Shapiro’s discussion of the entity theory of class actions. 
See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913, 925 & n.31 (1998) (referring to “truly indivisible interests of the class members” in Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes and noting that “[i]n certain cases in which 
injunctive relief is sought, a class of people will be affected if the relief is granted, whether 
the action is brought in form as an individual action or as a class action”). 
56 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 153. 
57 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) applies when a defendant may be subject to inconsistent judgments in 
  
2019] CLASS ACTIONS, INDIVISIBILITY, AND RULE 23(B)(2) 69 
 
which are certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and usually involve requests for 
monetary relief.58 
Nagareda argued that class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(2) 
focus on class-wide questions, such as the lawfulness of the defendant’s policies, 
rather than individualized questions, such as the amount of damages due to a 
particular class member.59 When class members seek damages, the defendant 
might be liable only to those class members who can prove specific causation 
and compensable harm.60 But when they do not seek damages, Nagareda wrote, 
“the liability issue—whether the defendant’s generally applicable conduct 
deviates from the governing legal standard—is indivisible in the sense that the 
defendant’s conduct is either lawful or unlawful as to everyone it affects.”61 
When the defendant’s conduct toward the class “is either permissible or 
not,”62 Nagareda argued, “a winning effort to stop the disputed conduct (or to 
compel legally required conduct) would, as a practical matter, redound to the 
benefit not just of those who are parties to the litigation but also to other affected 
 
the absence of class treatment. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) applies when 
multiple potential plaintiffs have claims against a limited fund too small to satisfy them all. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). These provisions, together with Rule 23(b)(2), are sometimes 
described as “mandatory” class actions, because they do not guarantee absent class members 
the right to opt out. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (explicitly requiring class members be allowed 
to opt out from Rule 23(b)(3) classes but not from Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) classes). 
58 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (allowing class certification when “court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring 
notice for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3) that informs members “that the court will 
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”). 
59 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 180. Nagareda’s subsequent work expanded this concept of 
remedial indivisibility to explicitly include Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as well. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1069, 1100 n.142 (2011). 
60 Although requests for damages can introduce individualized questions—especially in 
the mass tort cases that were Nagareda’s primary focus—they do not always do so. For 
example, in a case involving an unwanted, but otherwise inoffensive, text message sent to a 
known group of recipients, each recipient might be entitled to an identical amount in statutory 
damages. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (2012) (allowing individual suing for violation of 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act “to recover for actual monetary loss from such a 
violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater”). 
61 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 180 (emphasis added); see also Nagareda, supra note 18, at 
132 (“[T]he crux of [Rule 23(b)(2)] in actual operation today consists of the indivisible nature 
of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it 
can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of 
them.”). 
62 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 180; see also id. at 232 (“Properly conceived, mandatory 
class treatment proceeds from the recognition that it is not possible to ascertain the legality of 
the defendant’s conduct as to one affected claimant without necessarily doing so as to all 
others.”). 
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persons who remain on the sidelines.”63 Those benefits would occur regardless 
of whether the initial plaintiff sought class treatment. For example, if an 
employee successfully challenged an employer’s use of a discriminatory test in 
pay and promotion decisions, the employer would likely cease using that test for 
any of its pay and promotion decisions—and not just for decisions involving that 
particular plaintiff.64 Nagareda deemed it permissible to disallow opt-outs in 
such cases because “a mandatory class action does not so much impose its 
mandate [under those circumstances] as act upon the antecedent 
interdependence of class members’ claims.”65 
Nagareda served as an Associate Reporter for the ALI Principles, a project 
that began in 2004 and was completed in 2010.66 The project further developed 
the concept of indivisibility, articulating a distinction between “divisible” and 
“indivisible” remedies and mapping that distinction onto Rule 23(b): “As a 
general matter, ‘indivisible remedies’ are those handled primarily under Rules 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By contrast, 
‘divisible remedies’ are claims typically handled under Rule 23(b)(3).”67 
Thus, like Nagareda’s solo work, the ALI Principles deem remedial 
indivisibility to be a feature of all of the mandatory subtypes.68 Moreover, and 
 
63 Id. at 180. Nagareda added that, “even if this were not true as a practical matter, opt-out 
claimants could attempt to invoke Parklane issue preclusion in order to get the benefit of a 
class victory against the defendant.” Id. If one employee’s challenge failed, however, any 
nonparty employees would remain free to challenge the test again, unburdened by issue 
preclusion. Id. at 179 (noting that nonparties “could not have issue preclusion successfully 
interposed against them”). In Nagareda’s view, “[t]he situation of the injunctive or declaratory 
relief class challenging a general course of conduct thus forms a distinctive case for mandatory 
class treatment to rope in all would-be invokers of Parklane issue preclusion, if a class action 
is to take place at all.” Id. at 180. This argument references the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), which sometimes allows a plaintiff to 
rely on a proposition established in a case between a different plaintiff and the current 
defendant. For a more detailed explanation of Parklane preclusion, see infra note 128. 
64 See Nagareda, supra note 38, at 180 (“A disputed feature of a pension plan is either 
permissible or not; the same is true of a disputed administrative procedure or employment 
practice.”).  
65 Id. at 232. The ALI Principles, discussed below in notes 129 and 182, echo this language. 
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(arguing that “[m]andatory aggregation with respect to claims for an indivisible remedy 
simply recognizes the preexisting interdependence of such claims”). 
66 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07(h) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
Robert Klonoff and Charles Silver also served as Associate Reporters, and Samuel Issacharoff 
was the project’s Reporter. Id. 
67 Id. § 2.04 cmt. a. 
68 Much of the ALI Principles’ discussion of indivisible relief focuses on the “limited 
fund” scenario covered by Rule 23(b)(1)(B). See id. § 2.04; Judith Resnik, Compared to 
What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 669 (2011) (noting this focus and commenting that “relatively 
few [of the] illustrative cases involve injunctive relief”) However, the ALI Principles do 
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also like Nagareda’s individual work, the ALI Principles describe the distinction 
between divisibility and indivisibility in functional terms: the central question is 
whether ordering relief for one claimant would “as a practical matter”69 (or “in 
practical effect”70) determine the availability of relief for other claimants. 
B.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 
A year after the ALI Principles were completed, the Supreme Court decided 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. The case involved a putative class action on 
behalf of female Wal-Mart employees nationwide.71 The plaintiffs alleged that 
sexism suffused the company’s culture, harming all of the women who worked 
there.72 They sought injunctive relief, which would operate company-wide to 
change Wal-Mart’s allegedly discriminatory pay and promotion practices, and 
back pay, which would be distributed to eligible class members individually.73 
The plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for a single class seeking 
both forms of relief.74 
The Court unanimously held that the plaintiffs’ back pay claims could not be 
certified as part of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.75 Quoting Nagareda, the Court drew 
upon the scholarship about indivisibility discussed above: 
The key to the (b)(2) class is “the indivisible nature of the injunctive or 
declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it 
can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or 
 
provide an example of indivisible relief that maps onto Rule 23(b)(2); it involves a case in 
which “a claimant seeks a prohibitory injunction or a declaratory judgment with respect to a 
generally applicable policy or practice maintained by a defendant.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04 cmt. b, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
69 “Indivisible remedies are those such that the distribution of relief to any claimant as a 
practical matter determines the application or availability of the same remedy to other 
claimants.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
70 “Divisible remedies are those that entail the distribution of relief to one or more 
claimants individually, without determining in practical effect the application or availability 
of the same remedy to any other claimant.” Id. § 2.04(a) (emphasis added). 
71 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011). 
72 Id. (“The basic theory of [plaintiffs’] case is that a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ 
permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary 
decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby making every 
woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.”). 
73 Id. (“[Plaintiffs] seek[] injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and 
backpay.”). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 360. A separate holding, which interpreted the commonality requirement imposed 
by Rule 23(a)(2), split the Court five-four. Id. at 367-68 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (expressing agreement that case “should not have been certified under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2)” but dissenting from majority’s holding as to 
commonality).  
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as to none of them.” In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a 
single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each 
member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each 
individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or 
declaratory judgment against the defendant. Similarly, it does not authorize 
class certification when each class member would be entitled to an 
individualized award of monetary damages.76 
Even as the Court in this passage quotes a statement about Rule 23(b)(2) 
specifically,77 it invokes a concept—indivisibility—that scholars had developed 
for all of the mandatory subtypes.78 
Dukes has left a number of questions unanswered as to how courts should 
interpret Rule 23(b)(2).79 First, the majority opinion makes no mention of 
“cohesiveness,” a judge-made requirement that some courts have applied to Rule 
23(b)(2).80 This requirement has been heavily criticized,81 and some courts have 
rejected it outright.82 Even among those courts that have adopted a cohesiveness 
 
76 Id. at 360-61 (majority opinion) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 38, at 132). The Court 
went on to add that “[c]lasses certified under (b)(1) and (b)(2) share the most traditional 
justifications for class treatment—that individual adjudications would be impossible or 
unworkable, as in a (b)(1) class, or that the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class 
at once, as in a (b)(2) class.” Id. at 361-62 (citation omitted).  
77 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text (analyzing meaning of language quoted 
from Nagareda, supra note 18, at 132). 
78 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing development of indivisibility 
as concept applicable to all mandatory classes).  
79 See Marcus, supra note 16, at 830 (“Rule 23(b)(2) poses a stricter test after [Dukes], but 
confusion dogs its application.”).  
80 RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4:34 (“Courts have developed a test 
to ensure that such glue in fact exists in (b)(2) cases. Specifically, many courts demand that 
proponents of a (b)(2) class action demonstrate that the class’s claims are ‘cohesive.’”); see, 
e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (“While 23(b)(2) class 
actions have no predominance or superiority requirements, it is well established that the class 
claims must be cohesive.”). 
81 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 47, at 716 (“Cohesiveness limits the availability of the class 
action and does so in a crude way that correlates poorly with the values that the limits are 
supposed to serve.”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1855, 1856 (2015) (arguing that “[c]lass actions are no longer functional” due in part to courts’ 
“misguided focus on class members’ cohesiveness vis-à-vis one another”); Marcus, supra 
note 16, at 788-89 (arguing that cohesiveness requirement has “no anchor in the text of the 
rule” and has “proved incoherent in application”).  
82 See RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4:34 (identifying district courts 
across three circuits that have rejected cohesiveness test). At the same time, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that cohesiveness may be a relevant consideration under several other 
provisions of Rule 23. See Burch, supra note 81, at 872 (noting that Court has variously 
“identified cohesion as part of the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3), . . . suggested 
that cohesion was ensconced in Rule 23(b)(1)(B), . . . [and] appeared to locate cohesion 
within Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality” (citations omitted)). 
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requirement, the test has taken on several distinct forms.83 The Dukes opinion 
has left unclear whether indivisibility is meant to clarify, reject, replace, or 
supplement cohesiveness.84 
Second, the Dukes opinion does not explain how a lower court should 
distinguish between a single injunction with class-wide effects, on the one hand, 
and multiple injunctions with similar individual effects, on the other hand. This 
distinction has largely escaped scholarly attention, but it has significant 
implications. For example, consider a state law that prohibits granting marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.85 Does an order enjoining that law amount to a 
single injunction, because it invalidates a uniform statewide policy?86 Or does it 
amount to multiple injunctions, one for each couple seeking to marry, because 
each couple will have to apply for their own marriage license in order to obtain 
relief? The answer should be an easy one, but there are potential 
misunderstandings of indivisibility that would point in the other direction.87 
Third, the Court asserted that “the relief sought [under Rule 23(b)(2)] must 
perforce affect the entire class at once,”88 but it did not explain what type and 
degree of class-wide effects would suffice. This question, too, has largely 
escaped scholarly attention despite its broad potential effects. Consider, again, a 
state’s same-sex marriage ban. Does a plaintiff couple challenging that law seek 
relief that “perforce affect[s] the entire class at once,” so long as the legal 
question presented by any same-sex couple would be the same?89 Or do such 
 
83 Marcus, supra note 16, at 789 (describing three different forms of cohesiveness that 
appear in case law: (1) “a predominance inquiry,” (2) an inquiry into “whether a court could 
craft an injunction in fairly specific terms that would not require individualized tailoring for 
each class member,” and (3) an assessment of “the harmony of interests among class 
members”); see also RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4:34 (identifying “at 
least three distinct functions” served by cohesiveness requirement). 
84 See Marcus, supra note 16, at 830 (noting that after Dukes, “[s]ome courts continue to 
treat the Rule 23(b)(2) inquiry as a test for class ‘cohesion’”). Indeed, some courts have 
suggested that the cohesiveness and indivisibility inquiries are now identical. See Houser v. 
Pritzker, 28 F. Supp. 3d 222, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The cohesiveness element merely 
requires that plaintiffs’ legal injuries be similar enough that they all can be remedied with a 
single ‘indivisible’ injunction.”).  
85 This example is based on Harris v. Rainey, 299 F.R.D. 486, 494 (W.D. Va. 2014) 
(“[Defendant] puts forward one additional argument against class certification—that it should 
be denied because the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that [defendant] acted or refused 
to act on grounds that apply generally to the entire class [by denying marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples].”). 
86 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 417, 445 (2017) (noting “shift in the conception of legal invalidity, from an 
invalid law being one a judge merely failed to apply because a higher law controlled, to the 
conception of a judge ‘striking down’ and thus removing from operation an invalid law”). 
87 See infra Section II.B (discussing different forms of indivisibility).  
88 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361-62 (2011).  
89 As discussed infra Section II.B, Rule 23(b)(2) must be read in tandem with the 
commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)(2), which prevents certification unless class 
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plaintiffs seek relief that does not “perforce affect the entire class at once,” 
because the defendant could issue one same-sex couple a marriage license while 
continuing to deny marriage licenses to all others? Here, too, an overly 
restrictive understanding of indivisibility has the potential to lead courts astray. 
Getting Rule 23(b)(2) right is important. Class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2) 
protects against mootness, avoids the need for multiple claimants to spend 
money and social capital on their own separate litigation, ensures that the scope 
of the remedy will match the scope of the violation proved, limits a defendant’s 
ability to resist system-wide enforcement, and subjects the plaintiffs to the same 
preclusive consequences as the defendant.90 Answering the foregoing questions 
incorrectly would jeopardize these benefits in a broad range of cases affecting 
the public interest91—whether because class certification is sought and denied, 
potentially leaving members of the claimant group with inadequate or no relief,92 
or because class certification is not sought in the first place, potentially resulting 
in the individual action becoming moot before the court can reach a decision as 
to the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct.93 
II. MAPPING INDIVISIBILITY 
As the previous Part explained, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes described indivisibility as a requirement for Rule 23(b)(2) class actions 
specifically, but it drew upon an understanding of indivisibility from legal 
scholarship that applied to all of the mandatory subtypes. As noted previously, 
 
members’ claims “depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable 
of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an 
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 564 U.S. 
at 350. 
90 See generally Carroll, supra note 6 (discussing benefits and drawbacks of class 
treatment for plaintiffs seeking injuctive or declaratory relief). 
91 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (discussing class certification decisions 
in cases involving education, foster care, and conditions of confinment). 
92 See infra note 262 (discussing Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., No. 2:01-cv-
00928, 2012 WL 3600231, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2012), in which the district court 
dismissed remaining individual actions on remand from appellate court’s decision reversing 
class certification).  
93 See Carroll, supra note 6, at 2036-38 (discussing risk that plaintiff’s claim will become 
moot if class certification is not sought). For example, in Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 
(1975), the Supreme Court vacated an appellate decision in a prisoners’ rights case and 
remanded with instructions to dismiss the action as moot. Justice Marshall’s concurrence 
reads, in its entirety, as follows:  
I join this opinion only because for some reason respondent did not file this case as a 
class action. As a result, the State of New York by releasing the other three named 
plaintiffs, transferring respondent back to Wallkill after the District Court action, and 
finally to a lesser correctional facility after the Court of Appeals acted, thereby made the 
case moot. 
Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
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this Article seeks not to challenge Dukes, but to make sense of it. Making sense 
of Dukes requires breaking indivisibility down into its component parts and 
identifying which of those components best fits with Rule 23(b)(2). This Part 
takes up those tasks. 
A. Evaluating Consistency with Rule 23(b)(2) 
Even as the Dukes opinion left a number of questions unanswered, it 
implicitly suggested a framework for evaluating whether a particular 
interpretation of indivisibility would pass muster as a test for compliance with 
Rule 23(b)(2). The sources of that framework are twofold. 
First, of course, is the Court’s actual holding as to whether the putative class 
of Wal-Mart employees could meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). The 
Court explained that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not authorize class certification when 
each individual class member would be entitled to . . . an individualized award 
of monetary damages.”94 Because the plaintiffs in Dukes sought such 
individualized monetary relief—specifically, back pay—the Court held that the 
proposed class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).95 
Second, the Court explained that, because of Rule 23’s equitable origins, 
those determining its meaning should look to “the historical models on which 
the Rule was based.”96 In that regard, the Court noted that “‘[c]ivil rights cases 
against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination’ are prime 
examples of what (b)(2) is meant to capture.”97 The Court referred specifically 
to the cases listed in the Advisory Committee note to the 1966 amendments to 
the rule.98 Several of those cases involved challenges to the segregation of K-12 
public schools; another, Frasier v. Board of Trustees of the University of North 
Carolina,99 involved a challenge to a public university’s policy of refusing to 
admit African American students.100 
Taken together, these two aspects of Dukes suggest a test for evaluating 
whether a particular version of indivisibility should apply as a requirement for 
 
94 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360-61. 
95 Id. at 360.  
96 Id. at 361 (first citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997); and 
then citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 841-45 (1999)). 
97 Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 614). 
98 Id. (citing Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 289 n.5 (5th Cir. 1963); Brunson v. Bd. of Trs. 
of Sch. Dist. No. 1, Clarendon Cty., 311 F.2d 107, 109 (4th Cir. 1962); Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. 
of the Univ. of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per 
curiam)). 
99 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam). 
100 Id. at 590. The Advisory Committee note also referred to two hypothetical cases outside 
of the civil rights context, one involving an action by retailers against a seller alleged to 
impose an unlawful pricing differential, and another by purchasers or licensees against a 
patent-holder alleged to impose an unlawful tying condition. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)). 
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certification under Rule 23(b)(2). Properly construed, an indivisibility 
requirement should prevent class certification for a group of plaintiffs seeking 
back pay, and it should permit class certification for the plaintiff groups who 
brought the cases listed in the Advisory Committee note (including both the K-
12 student plaintiffs and the university-applicant plaintiffs). With that test in 
mind, this Article takes up the question of the different meanings indivisibility 
can take. 
B. The Forms of Indivisibility 
As explained below, this Article identifies two forms of indivisibility:101 
endpoint indivisibility102 and root-cause indivisibility.103 Each falls under the 
umbrella concept of indivisibility set forth in the legal scholarship upon which 
the Court relied in Dukes, but only root-cause indivisibility is consistent with the 
historical models for Rule 23(b)(2). 
Whatever form it takes, indivisibility cannot erase the commonality 
requirement, which is imposed by Rule 23(a)(2) and applies to all class actions. 
In order to satisfy commonality, a putative class must show that a legal or factual 
question central to all of their claims has the same answer for every member of 
the class.104 The following discussion will therefore evaluate the interaction 
between the commonality requirement and each potential version of 
indivisibility. 
 
101 A third form of indivisibility, which is less relevant to this discussion, involves multiple 
potential plaintiffs with valid claims against a monetary fund too small to satisfy them all. See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (referring 
to limited-fund scenario as example of indivisible relief). In those circumstances, if the 
defendant were to pay the complete amount of one plaintiff’s claim, it would become 
impossible for the defendant to pay the complete amount of all the other valid claims as well. 
One could use the term “limited-fund indivisibility” to describe this type of indivisible relief, 
in which providing complete relief to one class member makes it impossible to provide 
complete relief to all of the others. In such cases, to use the language of Dukes, “the relief 
sought must perforce affect the entire class at once.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361-62. 
The limited-fund scenario is the prototypical case for class treatment under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B). See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 816-17 (discussing propriety of limited fund class 
treatment). Accordingly, a requirement of limited-fund indivisibility would fit well with that 
provision. It plainly does not fit with the historical models for Rule 23(b)(2), however. See 
supra Section II.A (discussing the historical models for Rule 23(b)(2)). For example, 
admitting one African American student to a previously all-white high school does not make 
it impossible to admit others—or, indeed, to integrate the school district as a whole. 
102 See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing endpoint indivisibility). 
103 See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing root-cause indivisibility).  
104 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (“[Plaintiffs’] claims must depend upon a common 
contention . . . [that] must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which 
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”).  
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1. Endpoint Indivisibility 
In some circumstances involving indivisible relief, a defendant will be 
literally unable to provide complete relief to one claimant without 
simultaneously extending it to other members of a broader group. This Article 
uses the term “endpoint indivisibility” to describe this scenario, which is 
characterized by the immediate and unavoidable effects of providing complete 
relief to any member of the putative class.105 For example, a defendant cannot 
simultaneously build and not build a particular wheelchair ramp, issue and not 
issue a particular bond, or cease and not cease dumping wastewater from a 
particular pipe. In such cases, to use the Court’s language in Dukes, “the relief 
sought must perforce affect the entire class at once.”106 
That the members of a group are all immediately and unavoidably affected by 
the same conduct, so as to satisfy an endpoint indivisibility requirement, does 
not always entail that their claims all involve a common question of law or fact, 
so as to satisfy the commonality requirement.107 For example, consider a group 
of claimants who seek the construction of a wheelchair ramp, which would 
immediately and unavoidably benefit each of them. One subgroup of customers 
might base their demand for the ramp on the Americans with Disabilities Act’s 
(“ADA”) public accommodation provisions, while another subgroup of 
employees might base their demand for the ramp on the ADA’s employment 
discrimination provisions. In that scenario, an endpoint indivisibility 
requirement would operate in tandem with the commonality requirement to 
define the appropriate scope of the class (and any necessary subclasses). 
While the foregoing example involves injunctive relief, endpoint 
indivisibility also embraces some situations involving monetary relief. For 
example, consider a situation in which an anticipated future beneficiary of a 
retirement plan alleges that the defendant has caused losses to the fund as a 
whole.108 In those circumstances, a provision in the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) “permits plan participants to bring 
counts on behalf of the plan to recover plan injuries, not individual injuries.”109 
A plaintiff bringing such a claim can therefore seek an order requiring the 
defendant to make a payment in the amount of the loss to the retirement fund, 
 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35 (defining and discussing endpoint 
indivisibility). The term “logical indivisibility” could fit this category as well. See Carroll, 
supra note 1, at 854-55 (using term “logical indivisibility” in connection with Rule 
23(b)(1)(A)). I avoid that term in this Article, however, because of the potential confusion 
caused by the meaning of “logical impossibility” as understood by philosophers. I thank 
Professor Larry Solum for alerting me to this potential confusion.  
106 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361-62.  
107 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring members of class to show that “there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class”).  
108 See, e.g., Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 383, 385-86 (D.D.C. 2010).  
109 Id. at 390 (citing LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 
(2008)). 
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where it would be available for the payment of any future benefits. Because a 
defendant making that payment would simultaneously confer a benefit on all of 
the other anticipated beneficiaries, the situation is one of endpoint-indivisible 
relief. Such ERISA claims constitute the most common type of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
class action for monetary relief,110 which suggests that a requirement of endpoint 
indivisibility would fit well with that provision. 
Further support for a link between endpoint indivisibility and Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) comes from Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.111 There, a 
fraternal benefit organization sought to reorganize financially, and some 
members of the organization opposed the move.112 Of course, an organization 
cannot both financially reorganize and not financially reorganize at the same 
time. Accordingly, if the defendant were to halt the reorganization at the request 
of some members, all other members would also immediately and unavoidably 
experience that relief. The claimant group could thus satisfy an endpoint 
indivisibility requirement. The Advisory Committee note to the 1966 
amendments listed Cauble as a historical model for Rule 23(b)(1)(A), further 
suggesting that an endpoint indivisibility requirement would fit well with that 
provision. 
Might an endpoint indivisibility requirement also apply to Rule 23(b)(2)?113 
To answer that question, this Article turns to the test identified above, and 
particularly to the cases listed in the Advisory Committee note to the 1966 
amendments as historical models for Rule 23(b)(2).114 As noted previously, 
some of those cases involved challenges to the racial segregation of K-12 public 
schools.115 Whether the students bringing such challenges would satisfy an 
 
110 Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions for Monetary Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and 
(b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require Notice and Opt-Out Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
798, 814 (2014) (“The most common type of [Rule 23](b)(1)(A) action for money is a suit 
under ERISA.”).  
111 255 U.S. 356 (1921); see also Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, 
Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 
1605 (2007) (discussing Cauble as example of “situations in which the party opposing the 
class can act only indivisibly towards the class members”). 
112 Cauble, 255 U.S. at 359-60 (describing details of reorganization and resulting 
litigation).  
113 After all, some courts and scholars now treat Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(2) as 
largely overlapping, if not interchangeable. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 
253 F.3d 1180, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for 
essentially “collapsing the Rule 23(b)(1)(A) certification inquiry into that of Rule 23(b)(2)”); 
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 746 n.92 (2013) 
(noting that some courts’ interpretations of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) have rendered provision 
“essentially meaningless” because of resulting overlap with Rule 23(b)(2)). 
114 See supra Section II.A (discussing Advisory Committee’s note to 1966 amendments to 
Rule 23).  
115 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (listing civil rights cases addressed by 
Advisory Committee note).  
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endpoint indivisibility requirement depends on the nature of the underlying 
rights and remedies. 
In that regard, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Equal Protection 
Clause entitles a K-12 student to a racially nondiscriminatory public school 
assignment, not a racially integrated public school system.116 Accordingly, a 
defendant can provide complete relief through the named plaintiff’s race-neutral 
assignment to a particular school, even if the defendant takes no other steps 
toward racial integration.117 Because a defendant could provide that relief for 
one student while leaving all of the other students’ school assignments 
unchanged,118 providing complete relief to one claimant would not immediately 
and unavoidably afford relief to any of the others, and the putative class would 
not satisfy an endpoint indivisibility requirement.119 
 
116 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007), for example, the Court held that the defendants’ race-conscious school 
assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause, notwithstanding that the defendants’ goal 
was to promote racial diversity. Id. at 711. The Court “emphasized that the harm being 
remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and 
that ‘the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.’” Id. at 
721 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977)). 
117 Of course, it is possible to imagine a different understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause, pursuant to which K-12 students in segregation cases would satisfy an endpoint 
indivisibility requirement. In a 2007 dissent, for example, Justice Breyer expressed the view 
that the Clause requires “racially integrated education.” See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). On that view, the remedy due to any particular student would involve 
integration of the student’s entire school (or school district), such that a defendant could not 
possibly provide complete relief to one student without immediately and unavoidably 
providing it to others. Cf. Bray, supra note 86, at 455 (noting that “some desegregation decrees 
[in the post-Brown era] did go beyond protecting the plaintiff”). Justice Breyer’s dissent, 
however, was a dissent—the constitutional understanding it reflects did not carry the day. 
118 As Charles Alan Wright—one of the drafters of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23—put 
it, it would be entirely possible for a court “to tell a school board that it must accept Smith in 
a white school but need not accept Jones.” Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action 
Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 351 (2017) 
(quoting Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Benjamin Kaplan (Mar. 30, 1963), in RECORDS 
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 
1935-1988, microformed on CIS No. CI-7001, at 13, 15 (Cong. Info. Serv.)); cf. Robert L. 
Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2179, 2186 (1989) (“In the face of massive official resistance to local implementation 
of the Court’s decision in Brown, the civil rights attorney could never count on school officials 
to construe a court order admitting enumerated individual plaintiffs to a segregated school as 
an order to desegregate.”).  
119 Benjamin Kaplan, the Advisory Committee reporter during the drafting of the 1966 
amendments, appears to have believed (or at least feared) that courts would take this view of 
the relief warranted in a K-12 desegregation case. In support of the provision that would 
ultimately become Rule 23(b)(2), he wrote that “[i]f a school desegregation case, for example, 
is maintained by an individual on his own behalf, rather than as a class action, very likely the 
relief will be confined to admission of the individual to the school and will not encompass 
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In addition to K-12 desegregation cases, the 1966 Advisory Committee note 
included Frasier v. Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina, a case 
about a public university’s policy of excluding African American students. 
There, the plaintiffs sought (and ultimately received) an order requiring the 
university to consider African American applicants on the basis of their 
individual qualifications, rather than excluding them on the basis of their race.120 
The university could have provided the requested relief to any African American 
applicant, by considering his or her application without regard to the racially 
exclusionary policy, without immediately and unavoidably affecting any of the 
other potential class members. The plaintiffs would therefore not have satisfied 
an endpoint indivisibility requirement, making such a requirement inconsistent 
with another of the historical models for Rule 23(b)(2). 
The Advisory Committee note also provided two illustrative scenarios for 
Rule 23(b)(2) that did not involve civil rights: 
[A]n action looking to specific or declaratory relief could be brought by a 
numerous class of purchasers, say retailers of a given description, against 
a seller alleged to have undertaken to sell to that class at prices higher than 
those set for other purchasers, say retailers of another description, when the 
applicable law forbids such a pricing differential. So also a patentee of a 
machine, charged with selling or licensing the machine on condition that 
purchasers or licensees also purchase or obtain licenses to use an ancillary 
unpatented machine, could be sued on a class basis by a numerous group 
of purchasers or licensees, or by a numerous group of competing sellers or 
 
broad corrective measures—desegregation of the school.” Marcus, supra note 1, at 700 
(quoting Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to John P. Frank (Feb. 7, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE 
U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-
1988, microformed on CIS-6312-31, at 17-18 (Cong. Info. Serv.)). 
120 Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (M.D.N.C. 1955), 
aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam) (“[W]e decide only that the Negroes as a class may 
not be excluded because of their race or color; and the Board retains the power to decide 
whether the applicants possess the necessary qualifications.”). Even after the court issued the 
requested injunction in Frasier, the defendant still needed to consider each applicant’s unique 
qualifications in order to determine whether to actually admit any one of them. Id. This aspect 
of Frasier suggests that courts should generally not deny certification under Rule 23(b)(2) on 
the basis that the defendant will have individualized interactions with class members after the 
court issues a remedy. For example, in Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendant had not done enough to seek out and identify students with 
disabilities as required by 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2012)—the Child Find provision of the 
IDEA. 668 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs sought an injunction that would have 
involved extensive outreach to parents of children with potential disabilities, some of whom 
would then receive individual evaluations of their need for special education services. Id. at 
487. The remedy thus involved the class-wide removal of barriers to individualized 
consideration, just as in Frasier. The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court’s 
certification of the Rule 23(b)(2) class on the grounds that “the relief sought would merely 
initiate a process through which highly individualized determinations of liability and remedy 
are made.” Id. at 499. 
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licensors of the unpatented machine, to test the legality of the “tying” 
condition.121 
In the first of these scenarios, the defendant seller could use the lower price 
in transactions with any given retailer without immediately and unavoidably 
changing its pricing in transactions with any of the others. In the second, the 
defendant patentee could allow any given purchaser to buy only the primary 
machine while still requiring others to buy the ancillary machine as well. 
Accordingly, in neither of these scenarios would the plaintiffs satisfy an 
endpoint indivisibility requirement, making such a requirement inconsistent 
with these historical models for Rule 23(b)(2).  
In sum, although an endpoint indivisibility requirement appears to be a good 
fit for Rule 23(b)(1)(A),122 such a requirement would lead to the denial of class 
certification in cases and scenarios recognized as historical models for Rule 
23(b)(2). In the context of the latter provision, a different version of indivisibility 
must therefore apply. 
2. Root-Cause Indivisibility 
Another version of indivisibility, which I term “root-cause indivisibility,” 
similarly applies to circumstances in which “the relief sought must perforce 
affect the entire class at once.”123 But while endpoint indivisibility turns on the 
literal impossibility of a defendant providing complete relief to one claimant 
without producing a class-wide impact, root-cause indivisibility turns on the 
practical effects of successful litigation by any given member of the putative 
class.124 
Specifically, in situations of root-cause indivisibility, the plaintiff challenges 
a defendant’s conduct that causes harm to both the plaintiff and a broader group, 
such that deciding the case in the plaintiff’s favor would require a court to rule 
the conduct unlawful.125 In such cases, as Nagareda put it, “it is not possible to 
ascertain the legality of the defendant’s conduct as to one affected claimant 
without necessarily doing so as to all others.”126 Even if the court does not then 
 
121 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)).  
122 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 854-55 (noting connection between this form of 
indivisibility and Rule 23(b)(1)(A)).  
123 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361-62 (2011).  
124 As noted previously, the scholarly articulation of indivisibility explicitly contemplated 
that practical effects could create situations of indivisible relief. See supra Section I.A 
(discussing scholarship linking indivisibility to practical effects of litigation).  
125 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (defining and discussing root-cause 
indivisibility). To frame the point in terms used by Professor Elizabeth Burch, this type of 
challenge involves “conduct components” shared by the entire class. See Burch, supra note 
81, at 1874-81 (explaining distinction between “conduct components” of claim, which relate 
to defendant’s conduct, and “eligibility components,” which entitle particular plaintiffs to 
relief they request).  
126 See Nagareda, supra note 38, at 232. 
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enjoin the defendant’s conduct as to all of those affected, the litigation can be 
expected to produce class-wide benefits—whether through the generation of 
precedent about the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct,127 the invocation of 
issue preclusion in other claimants’ lawsuits against the defendant,128 or the 
defendant’s decision to cease engaging in the challenged conduct altogether.129 
As with endpoint indivisibility, root-cause indivisibility operates in tandem 
with commonality to define the appropriate scope of the class (and any necessary 
subclasses) in light of the applicable substantive law.130 Consider Ms. L. v. 
ICE,131 a substantive due process challenge to the government’s “family 
separation” practice of separating migrant parents from their children at the 
border.132 When a putative class of migrant parents sought certification under 
Rule 23(b)(2), the district court narrowed the proposed class definition to 
 
127 Cf. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group 
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1647 (1997) (arguing 
that generation of precedent means that some cases are “not purely self-regarding acts with 
no externalities”).  
128 See Nagareda, supra note 38, at 175-81 (discussing interplay between issue preclusion 
and mandatory class treatment). The form of issue preclusion (also known as collateral 
estoppel) relevant here is nonmutual offensive issue preclusion, which refers to the following 
scenario: Plaintiff A sues Defendant X in non-class litigation. Plaintiff B also sues Defendant 
X on a claim presenting an issue that was decided against Defendant X in its litigation with 
Plaintiff A. Although Plaintiff A and Plaintiff B are not the same party, Plaintiff B seeks to 
bind Defendant X to the prior court’s decision on that issue. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (permitting nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, at 
discretion of the district court, under certain circumstances). The Supreme Court has held that 
courts may not apply this form of issue preclusion against the federal government. See United 
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984) (“Parklane Hosiery’s approval of nonmutual 
offensive collateral estoppel is not to be extended to the United States.”). 
129 As the ALI Principles put it in their discussion of indivisible remedies involving 
injunctive or declaratory relief: 
When a claimant seeks a prohibitory injunction or a declaratory judgment with respect 
to a generally applicable policy or practice maintained by a defendant, those remedies—
if afforded—generally stand to benefit or otherwise affect all persons subject to the 
disputed policy or practice, even if relief is nominally granted only as to the named 
claimant. Even in litigation against governmental entities, to which limitations on 
preclusion may apply as a formal matter, the generally applicable nature of the policy or 
practice typically means that the defendant government will be in a position, as a 
practical matter, either to maintain or to discontinue the disputed policy or practice as a 
whole, not to afford relief therefrom only to the named claimant.  
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010). The formal 
“limitations on preclusion” referenced in this passage result from Mendoza, which held that 
courts may not apply nonmutual collateral estoppel against the federal government. Mendoza, 
464 U.S. at 158; see also supra note 128 (discussing Mendoza and limitations on preclusion). 
130 See supra text accompanying note 107 (discussing how commonality requirement 
operates in tandem with endpoint indivisibility requirement to define class scope).  
131 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018).  
132 Id. at 1162. 
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exclude those with criminal histories or communicable disease, reasoning that 
separating such parents from their children could involve factual and legal 
questions not shared by the broader group.133 Because the government’s practice 
of family separation could not be constitutional as to some members of the 
narrowed class but not others,134 the narrowed class satisfied a root-cause 
indivisibility requirement. Because it would be possible for the government to 
keep some families together while separating others, however, an endpoint 
indivisibility requirement would not have been satisfied. 
Consider, also, a state that refuses to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples solely because of their same-sex status (i.e., without regard to whether 
they are otherwise eligible to marry). Because the state’s conduct could not be 
lawful as to one same-sex couple but unlawful as to another, a court hearing such 
a challenge by any same-sex couple would have to decide the lawfulness of the 
state’s conduct (i.e., the denial of marriage licenses solely because the applicants 
are members of the same sex) as to all same-sex couples.135 A putative class of 
same-sex couples bringing such a challenge would therefore satisfy a root-cause 
indivisibility requirement. That class would not satisfy an endpoint indivisibility 
requirement, however, because the defendant could provide complete relief to 
one same-sex couple (by issuing that couple a marriage license) without 
simultaneously providing relief to any of the others.136 
 
133 See Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 11, 17 n.10, Ms. 
L. v. ICE, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018). 
134 See id. at 17 (“A determination regarding whether the practice of family separation and 
failure to reunify such families violates due process and warrants injunctive relief would apply 
to each class member . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
135 The point here is not that all such couples must be permitted to marry or not; rather, the 
point is that the state has given the same reason for denying marriage licenses to all such 
couples, and that reason must be constitutionally permissible or not. The Supreme Court has 
established that it is not, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015), but the 
opposite conclusion would have supported class certification as well. 
136 Cf. Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented 
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 487, 492 n.18 (2016) (“Even if a law is facially unconstitutional, it often will be 
possible for a trial or appellate court to enjoin its enforcement solely against individual 
plaintiffs in a case, rather than completely.”). To be sure, a state might choose to treat all 
same-sex couples similarly with respect to the issuance of marriage licenses. It might even 
determine that state or federal law requires it to do so. It nonetheless remains true that a state 
can issue a marriage license to one same-sex couple without simultaneously granting one to 
all of the others; indeed, that type of differential treatment has occurred fairly recently. During 
a period in 2004, for example, some same-sex couples in San Francisco, California were 
issued marriage licenses while couples in other parts of the state were denied them. See Sylvia 
A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 
3 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 1, 6-7 (2007) (describing San Fransisco mayor’s decision to grant 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples). And during a period in 2015, some same-sex couples 
in Rowan County, Kentucky were denied marriage licenses while couples in other parts of 
the state were issued them. See Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of 
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As the foregoing examples demonstrate, there exist cases in which the 
plaintiff group could satisfy a requirement of root-cause indivisibility but not 
endpoint indivisibility. In such cases, the defendant interacts with the claimants 
both as individuals (e.g., in denying particular marriage license applications) and 
as members of a group (e.g., in enacting a ban on same-sex marriages). Although 
the defendant’s group-directed conduct is the root cause of every group 
member’s injuries, those injuries could be prevented or ameliorated through 
deviations in the defendant’s individually-directed conduct.137 What ties the 
potential plaintiffs together is not the defendant’s inability to treat them 
differently, but the defendant’s actual conduct that treats them similarly.138 Such 
root-cause, group-directed conduct is a common feature of government 
institutions and other large organizations, which often lack the capacity to 
engage in wholly individualized decision-making.139 
Notwithstanding this area of difference, a putative class that satisfies the 
commonality requirement and an endpoint indivisibility requirement will 
generally satisfy a root-cause indivisibility requirement as well.140 Take, for 
example, Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble. As discussed above,141 Cauble 
 
Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 269 (2016) (noting Rowan County Clerk’s 
refusal to issue marriage licenses).  
137 This set of cases roughly corresponds to Types II and III in Professor David Marcus’s 
typology of public interest class actions: bureaucratic intermediaries carry out a defendant’s 
high-level policy or systemic practice, and the claimants experience either undifferentiated 
but individually directed conduct (Type II) or differentiated conduct (Type III). See Marcus, 
supra note 16, at 799-805. 
138 See id. at 801-02. 
139 The ubiquity of abstracted decision-making rules is one of the reasons that federal 
agencies have increasingly turned to administrative class actions and other forms of aggregate 
adjudication in recent years. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the 
Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1634, 1634 (2017) (describing “agencies’ nascent efforts 
to use class actions and other complex procedures in their own hearings”).  
140 On the one hand, this relationship between endpoint and root-cause indivisibility 
reflects the existence of overlap between Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(1)(A). The drafters of 
the 1966 amendments recognized the possibility that some classes could fit within both 
categories, but they decided to include both provisions nonetheless, largely because of the 
possibility that pro-segregation judges would not deem Rule 23(b)(1)(A) satisfied in 
desegregation cases. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 705-07 (describing discussions among John 
Frank, Charles Alan Wright, and Benjamin Kaplan). On the other hand, the overlap between 
those two forms of indivisibility is more extensive than the overlap between the two 
provisions of Rule 23(b), assuming (as Professor Robert Klonoff has persuasively argued) 
that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) should be interpreted to cover classes seeking monetary relief. See 
Klonoff, supra note 110, at 803 (“[B]oth [Rule 23](b)(1)(A) and [Rule 23](b)(1)(B) 
contemplate suits for money, even when money is the exclusive or predominant relief 
sought.”).  
141 See supra text accomanying notes 111-12 (noting endpoint indivisibility satisfied 
because “if the defendant were to halt the reorganization at the request of some members, all 
other members would also immediately and unavoidably experience that relief”).  
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involved a situation of endpoint indivisibility, because the defendant could not 
both undergo and not undergo a financial reorganization.142 In addition, that 
reorganization either would be lawful or it would not—a court would not be able 
“to ascertain the legality of the defendant’s conduct as to one affected claimant 
without necessarily doing so as to all others.”143 Accordingly, the plaintiffs in 
Cauble would also satisfy a root-cause indivisibility requirement. 
For root-cause indivisibility, as for endpoint indivisibility, what matters to the 
analysis is the right actually invoked and the relief actually requested. Class 
action complaints do not exist in a state of nature, awaiting discovery by 
claimants and counsel. Rather, class action plaintiffs must decide what legal 
theories they will pursue and what remedies they will seek, and those choices 
affect the relevance of intra-class differences and the scope of a proper Rule 
23(b)(2) class. 
For example, consider Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, in which the plaintiffs 
alleged that sex discrimination resulted from the combination of a 
discriminatory corporate culture and the delegation to local managers of 
discretion over pay and promotion decisions.144 As noted previously, the 
plaintiffs in Dukes sought both company-wide injunctive relief and 
individualized awards of back pay.145 The latter form of relief cannot satisfy a 
root-cause indivisibility requirement, because any particular employee’s 
entitlement to back pay will depend on circumstances specific to that 
employee.146 Consider, for example, an employer’s decision to promote male 
Employee A over female Employees B and C. The employer’s conduct might be 
unlawful as to Employee B, who is more qualified than the promoted employee 
(and who is entitled to back pay for the employer’s failure to promote her), but 
lawful as to Employee C, who is less qualified than the promoted employee (and 
who is not entitled to back pay for the employer’s failure to promote her).  
The plaintiffs’ actual choice of remedy in Dukes made intra-class differences 
relevant to the class certification inquiry.147 But what if they had requested only 
injunctive relief, seeking to change Wal-Mart’s company-wide pay and 
promotion practices? If the plaintiffs’ evidence about those practices were 
sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement—a point on which the actual 
 
142 See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 359 (1921).  
143 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 232.  
144 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342 (2011).  
145 See supra Section I.B (describing remedies sought by plaintiffs).  
146 See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352 (“Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for all 
those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ 
claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I 
disfavored.”). As the Court noted, in an individual’s Title VII claim seeking back pay, “the 
crux of the inquiry is ‘the reason for a particular employment decision.’” Id. (quoting Cooper 
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984)).  
147 See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 352. 
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majority and dissent disagreed148—then the hypothetical class would also satisfy 
a root-cause indivisibility requirement. That is because a court could not deem 
those company-wide practices unlawful as to one female employee, in the sense 
that they produced a disparate impact and should be enjoined, but lawful as to 
another. Intra-class differences would not disappear, but they would cease to be 
relevant to the indivisibility requirement in light of the relief being sought. 
Because it would prevent certification of a putative class of employees 
seeking back pay, a root-cause indivisibility requirement satisfies one aspect of 
this Article’s framework for evaluating consistency with Rule 23(b)(2).149 The 
other aspect of that framework is that, if it is to be applied to Rule 23(b)(2), an 
indivisibility requirement should permit class certification in the cases forming 
the historical models for the provision.150 Consider, first, a group of African 
American students challenging a school district’s operation of segregated K-12 
public schools. Whether brought by one student or many, a successful challenge 
would require a court to declare such segregation unlawful; it could not be 
unlawful for a school to exclude one African American student on the basis of 
race but lawful for the school to exclude another African American student on 
the basis of race.151 The putative class would therefore satisfy a root-cause 
indivisibility requirement. 
Next, consider Frasier v. Board of Trustees of the University of North 
Carolina. The university’s policy of rejecting all African American applicants 
on the basis of race—regardless of their qualifications for admission—could not 
be lawful as to one African American applicant but unlawful as to another.152 
 
148 While all nine justices agreed with the Rule 23(b)(2) portion of the Dukes opinion, the 
Court split five-four as to whether the putative class satisfied commonality. See id. at 367-68 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with majority’s 
disqualification of class at “starting gate” of commonality). The majority held that Wal-Mart’s 
delegation of discretion to local managers was not a “specific employment practice” subject 
to challenge under Title VII. Id. at 357 (majority opinion) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).  
149 See supra Section II.A (describing framework for evaluating whether particular type of 
indivisibility should be imposed as requirement for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) by 
determining whether indivisibility requirement would prevent certification of classes seeking 
back pay).  
150 See supra Section II.A (describing further framework for evaluating indivisibility by 
determining whether indivisibility requirement would prevent certification of classes 
corresponding to historical models for Rule 23(b)(2)). 
151 While successful litigation might not lead to all African American students receiving 
different school assignments than they otherwise would have, the school district’s reason for 
excluding all African American students from particular schools (i.e., because of their race) 
could only be unlawful, or not, as to all of the excluded students at once.  
152 See Frasier v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (M.D.N.C. 1955), 
aff’d, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam) (“[W]e decide only that the Negroes as a class may 
not be excluded because of their race or color; and the Board retains the power to decide 
whether the applicants possess the necessary qualifications.”). 
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This is true notwithstanding that, once a court ordered the university to consider 
each African American applicant on his or her merits, those individuals’ 
qualifications for admission would surely vary; ultimately, the university would 
admit some and not others. Because a successful challenge by any African 
American applicant would require a court to rule the blanket exclusion of 
African Americans unlawful, the plaintiffs in Frasier would satisfy a root-cause 
indivisibility requirement as well.  
Finally, consider the two hypothetical cases listed in the Advisory Committee 
note, one involving a seller that imposed a pricing differential between different 
classes of purchasers, and the other involving a patent-holder that imposed a 
tying condition on its products.153 The pricing differential or tying arrangement 
could not be lawful as to some members of the disadvantaged class but unlawful 
as to others, and a successful challenge to either arrangement would require the 
court to rule on that practice’s lawfulness.154 Accordingly, the putative classes 
in both scenarios would satisfy a root-cause indivisibility requirement. 
In sum, unlike endpoint indivisibility, a root-cause indivisibility requirement 
would both screen out back pay awards and screen in the historical models on 
which Rule 23(b)(2) was based. Root-cause indivisibility also offers the best 
normative fit for Rule 23(b)(2), as it allows the provision to fulfill its promise of 
providing a remedy as broad as the challenged conduct and “settling the legality 
of the [defendant’s] behavior with respect to the class as a whole.”155 
Accordingly, while other forms of indivisibility can play a useful role in the 
interpretation of other class action subtypes, only root-cause indivisibility makes 
sense as a requirement for Rule 23(b)(2).  
C. Due Process Implications 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are mandatory, in the sense that Rule 23 does not 
give claimants the right to opt out of classes certified under that provision.156 
This aspect of the rule has occasionally led courts to express concerns about the 
due process rights of absent class members.157 Those concerns cannot render the 
 
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)) 
(describing hypotheticals involving class of purchasers challenging price differentials and 
class of licensees or sellers of unpatented machine challenging tying condition); supra note 
122 and accompanying text (explaining why neither of these plaintiff groups would satisfy 
endpoint indivisibility requirement). 
154 See supra text accompanying note 122 (explaining relief sought by plaintiffs in both 
scenarios). 
155 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)) 
(observing Rule 23(b)(2) intended to apply where defendant “has taken action or refused to 
take action with respect to a class, and final relief . . . settling the legality of the behavior with 
respect to the class as a whole is appropriate”). 
156 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (explicitly requiring class members be allowed to opt out from 
Rule 23(b)(3) classes but not from Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) classes). 
157 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362-63 (2011) (noting due 
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foregoing analysis irrelevant, because the canon of constitutional avoidance 
permits a court only to “interpret [a rule or] statute, not rewrite it.”158 Still, if an 
endpoint indivisibility requirement would clearly make Rule 23(b)(2) comply 
with due process, and a root-cause indivisibility requirement would clearly make 
Rule 23(b)(2) violate due process, some judges might be tempted to adopt the 
former. That temptation, however, should be easily avoided; as explained below, 
neither form of indivisibility would render mandatory class treatment under Rule 
23(b)(2) unconstitutional.159 
Opt-outs protect an absent class member’s right to his or her own day in court, 
but as Professor Robert Bone has noted, the day-in-court right is not absolute.160 
Rather, “[i]t is an institutional right and, as such, is subject to and defined by the 
norms that govern the institution of adjudication itself,” including “factors that 
have to do with making adjudication a just and efficacious institution.”161 A 
claimant’s right not to sue the defendant,162 which is the negative form of the 
day-in-court right, is subject to the same analysis. One must therefore ask not 
only how mandatory class treatment can constrain claimants in situations of 
endpoint and root-cause indivisibility, but also how disallowing opt-outs in such 
situations can promote institutional values like fairness and judicial legitimacy. 
The constraints imposed by mandatory class treatment are not unique to Rule 
23; to the contrary, other procedural rules similarly reflect a judgment that the 
benefits of those constraints outweigh their costs. Consider Rule 19, which 
governs required-party joinder in non-class cases. The provision allows a 
defendant to seek dismissal of a case because the plaintiff has not joined a person 
who would be affected by the outcome, or in whose absence the court could not 
afford complete relief.163 In some circumstances, if a required party refuses to 
 
process concerns in connection with Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) as excluding 
claims for individualized monetary relief).  
158 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018) (“Under the constitutional-avoidance 
canon, when statutory language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an 
interpretation that raises serious constitutional doubts . . . . But a court relying on that canon 
still must interpret the statute, not rewrite it.”).  
159 But see infra text accompanying notes 193-94 (noting that, for either form of 
indivisibility, supplemental inquiry would be necessary in order to comply with Supreme 
Court precedent about due process and class actions seeking monetary relief).  
160 See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for 
Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 618-19 (2011) (“The 
day-in-court right is not a background right that applies in all settings, like the right to be free 
from torture.”).  
161 Id. at 618.  
162 See Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 604 (2015) (discussing interests of “prospective class members who 
wish to keep their legal claims out of court entirely” (emphasis omitted)).  
163 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A)-(B) (requiring joinder where either (1) “court cannot 
accord complete relief” in party’s absence or (2) absent party “claims an interest relating to 
the subject of the action”).  
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join the action, the court may order him joined as an involuntary plaintiff.164 
From the perspective of the involuntary plaintiff, Rule 19 thus constrains a 
claimant’s ability to avoid suing the defendant; and from the perspective of the 
original plaintiff, it constrains a claimant’s ability to go it alone.165 Those 
constraints on claimant autonomy are analogous to those imposed by mandatory 
class treatment; because absent class members cannot opt out, they can neither 
avoid suing the defendant nor go it alone in a separate action. In the context of 
Rule 19, those constraints are “justified by a balance of institutional 
considerations.”166 
Similar institutional considerations also justify those constraints in the context 
of mandatory class actions that satisfy an endpoint or root-cause indivisibility 
requirement.167 Consider situations of endpoint indivisibility, in which one 
claimant’s victory would immediately and unavoidably result in relief for all of 
the others.168 Because a defendant in such a case literally cannot treat different 
claimants differently,169 allowing some claimants to opt out and sue separately 
would create the risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . that would 
establish incompatible standards of conduct” for the defendant.170 Opt-outs 
would thus jeopardize the defendant’s ability to comply with court orders and 
undermine the legitimacy of the judicial system.171 At the same time, because of 
the inherently interdependent nature of the potential plaintiffs’ claims, opt-out 
rights would not confer commensurate benefits upon absent class members. To 
the extent that opting out would allow a claimant to avoid the impact of a 
 
164 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2) (“A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made 
either a defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.”).  
165 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 855-56 nn.67-69 and accompanying text (noting Rule 19 
similarly addresses risk of inconsistent adjudications).  
166 Bone, supra note 160, at 618. As Professor Bone explains, “plaintiffs—indeed, all 
parties—have a general duty to conduct litigation with due regard for fairness to other litigants 
and for the integrity of the institution of adjudication itself. Some types of harm are serious 
enough to implicate this duty, and those are the harms Rule 19 targets.” Id. 
167 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07 cmt. h-i (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(discussing institutional interests furthered by mandatory aggregation in cases involving 
indivisible remedies). 
168 See supra text accompanying note 105 (noting that endpoint indivisibility is 
“characterized by the immediate and unavoidable effects of providing complete relief to any 
member of the putative class”).  
169 See supra Section II.B.1 (defining endpoint indivisibility).  
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (permitting class action in cases of inconsistent or varying 
adjudications described in text).  
171 See Carroll, supra note 1, at 854-57 (discussing purposes of class treatment under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A)). Opt-outs would also deny the defendant the benefit of any cases resolved in its 
favor; so long as even one case went the other way, the defendant would have to comply with 
the resulting decree. See Redish & Larsen, supra note 111, at 1606 (noting that defendant 
“would lose the benefit of its victory” if this scenario were to occur, which “should not be 
deemed an acceptable result”).  
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potential loss while maintaining the ability to reap the benefits of a potential 
victory, that interest should not be given controlling weight in the due process 
analysis.172 
The institutional considerations that support mandatory class treatment in 
situations of root-cause indivisibility, in which deciding the case in one 
claimant’s favor would require a court to rule the defendant’s conduct unlawful 
as to others, are also quite strong. As with endpoint indivisibility, situations of 
root-cause indivisibility involve an action that stands to affect all of the other 
potential class members, even in the absence of class certification—here, 
through the operation of issue preclusion, precedent, or semi-voluntary changes 
in the defendant’s behavior.173 Those mechanisms can similarly create a 
situation in which one claimant’s victory will redound to the benefit of all of the 
others. As Nagareda put it, mandatory class actions “rope the would-be invokers 
of [nonmutual offensive] issue preclusion into a single class such that they will 
be bound by any resulting adjudication of classwide issues.”174 
From the perspective of absent class members, while opting out could have 
benefits, those benefits are limited by the potential impact of precedent. Arthur 
Miller once argued that “Supreme Court decisions, in constitutional cases at 
least, are de facto class actions” because of the binding principles they establish 
for all other cases to follow.175 Similar effects can flow from a previous appellate 
decision about the lawfulness of the exact same policy or practice—not merely 
a related or analogous one—being challenged in a subsequent case.176 From the 
perspective of those subsequent litigants, the absence of class-wide preclusion 
will not make a practical difference in their ability to have their claims heard 
anew in light of the precedent foreclosing their claims.177 
 
172 See Nagareda, supra note 38, at 180 (“If permitted to opt out, however, the members 
of such a class would enjoy the benefits of a class victory on the liability question either 
practically or, if need be, through invocation of Parklane issue preclusion.”). 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 127-29 (describing class-wide benefits). 
174 Nagareda, supra note 38, at 177. For further discussion of this type of issue preclusion 
and its relevance to mandatory class actions, see supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
175 Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on 
the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573, 574-75 (1981) (explaining 
constitutional “rulings in cases involving individuals ‘impose official and practical 
consequences upon members of society at large’” (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring))); see also 
Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 139, 1647-48 (recognizing connection between 
precedential impact of individual adjudication and preclusive effect of class actions).  
176 See Redish & Larsen, supra note 111, at 1609 n.129 (“Even though neither res judicata 
nor collateral estoppel would apply to the class member who had removed herself from the 
class, the problem of same situation stare decisis would remain a very significant concern.”). 
177 See Rubenstein, supra note 127, at 1647 (“The only difference between this 
precedential effect and pure preclusion is that the later plaintiffs can literally have their day—
albeit a short one—in court.” (footnote omitted)); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis 
and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2003) (“[W]hen viewed from the 
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To be sure, many class actions do not generate binding precedent;178 if the 
defendant were to prevail in such a case, those who opted out might benefit from 
being able to sue again.179 From a defendant’s perspective, that type of parallel 
or follow-on litigation can create the risk of serial relitigation,180 but from an 
absent class member’s perspective, it can reflect genuine disagreements about 
what remedies to pursue. In a desegregation case, for example, some claimants 
might favor the creation of magnet schools, while others might seek modified 
pupil assignment policies for the existing schools.181 It may even be possible—
if not efficient—for a defendant to provide different claimants with different 
remedies simultaneously. At the same time, allowing different claimants to 
pursue separate actions can make settlement more difficult for any of them to 
achieve182—and, as recent multidistrict litigations have demonstrated, can lead 
 
perspective of an individual litigant, stare decisis often functions like the doctrine of issue 
preclusion—it precludes the relitigation of issues decided in earlier cases.”). 
178 See Carroll, supra note 6, at 2052 n.202 (“For example, the initial plaintiff might choose 
not to appeal an adverse decision, or the appellate court might resolve the case in an 
unpublished opinion that cannot be cited as precedent. The latter has a high degree of 
likelihood, as more than eighty-eight percent of federal appellate decisions are unpublished.” 
(citation omitted)).  
179 Then again, they might not; even unpublished opinions and district court decisions 
sometimes have precedent-like effects. For example, some unpublished opinions “are 
followed without being either cited or quoted” because “portions of their text get repeatedly 
copied and pasted into other unpublished opinions.” Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 153, 153 (2012). Some judges have tallied up other district courts’ 
opinions on the question before them in deciding how to rule. See Brian Soucek & Remington 
B. Lamons, Heightened Pleading Standards for Defendants: A Case Study of Court-Counting 
Precedent, 93 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3164416 [https://perma.cc/3H9M-Y5RP]. 
180 See Carroll, supra note 6, at 2052 (“[A] defendant cannot know ahead of time how 
much force that precedent will ultimately exert; it may end up acting as a practical bar to 
lawsuits by other affected claimants, or it may leave the defendant subject to serial 
relitigation.”).  
181 On remedial disagreements in desegregation cases, see generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).  
182 Even without regard to settlement incentives, the ALI Principles argue that “the 
mandatory nature of the proceeding advances due process in several ways” in class actions 
involving indivisible relief: 
First, it creates a forum in which all interested persons may voice their views concerning 
the practice or policy. Second, it enables the court to craft an indivisible remedy that 
burdens the defendant and any dissenting claimants to the minimum extent needed to 
vindicate the rights asserted in the complaint. Third, it avoids the risk of inconsistent 
adjudications and relief. Fourth, it affords complete resolution of the dispute concerning 
indivisible relief in the event of judgment on the merits in favor of the party opposing 
the aggregated claimants.  
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.07 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  
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to coercive settlement provisions designed to promote the defendant’s interests 
in closure.183 
Class treatment in situations of root-cause indivisibility offers other benefits, 
despite the potential burdens, for the litigation autonomy of absent class 
members.184 In the absence of class treatment, although the litigation might 
generate precedent that forecloses their claims, similarly situated claimants will 
be strangers to the litigation (unless they happen to learn about it and 
successfully intervene).185 Class treatment can improve on those circumstances 
by creating participatory opportunities—for example, by permitting absent class 
members to object to any proposed settlement186—and, more generally, by 
obligating the court to conduct the proceedings in a manner that protects the 
interests of the class as a whole.187 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the 
constitutionality of mandatory class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2); it has, 
however, stated that due process requires opt-out rights in class actions 
“concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments.”188 Neither 
an endpoint indivisibility requirement nor a root-cause indivisibility requirement 
would screen out cases seeking such relief. As to root-cause indivisibility,189 
consider a challenge to a university’s action uniformly raising tuition by two 
hundred dollars for all undergraduates in the middle of a prior academic year, in 
 
183 See D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2175, 2176 (2017) (noting that “securing sufficient closure is often critical to making 
settlement possible” and offering taxonomy of approaches to achieving such closure in 
multidistrict litigation settlements).  
184 See RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4.34 (“[I]n a (b)(2) setting, 
certification is not a penalty to the class but protection for it.”).  
185 Carroll, supra note 6, at 2060 (“[C]hoice of class treatment gives those similarly 
situated to the plaintiff the status of class members, while the individual form leaves them as 
strangers to the litigation (unless and until they successfully intervene).”); see also id. at 2058 
(“In a challenge to a defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice, . . . the threat to 
litigant autonomy comes as much from the interdependent nature of the potential claims as 
the procedural means of prosecuting them. The existence of the policy or practice creates an 
interrelationship among those persons affected by it, and that interrelationship gives rise to 
difficult questions about remedial scope and preclusive effects. The class action represents an 
attempt to address those questions; it does not create them.” (footnotes omitted)). 
186 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring that absent class members receive notice and 
opportunity to object prior to approval of any proposed settlement).  
187 See Carroll, supra note 6, at 2060 (“Class proceedings on the whole must be conducted 
so as to protect the interests of absent class members.”). The interests of those who are not 
class members can be better protected as well; for example, they may appear and object to a 
proposed class settlement, something that is generally not possible in a non-class case. See id. 
188 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985). But see Klonoff, supra 
note 110, at 800 (arguing that this language in Shutts and later cases reaffirming it “can be 
characterized as dictum”).  
189 For an example of a putative class seeking solely monetary relief that would satisfy an 
endpoint indivisibility requirement, see supra Section II.B.1. 
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alleged violation of a state statute prohibiting midyear tuition increases.190 So 
long as the tuition increase either did or did not violate the statute as to all 
undergraduates, a successful challenge by any student who sought a refund 
would require a court to rule the increase unlawful as to all of them. The plaintiff 
group could therefore satisfy a root-cause indivisibility requirement, even if they 
were to seek only monetary relief. 
In light of the Court’s assertions about the due process rights of absent class 
members with claims “wholly or predominately” for monetary relief, root-cause 
indivisibility is necessary but not sufficient as a test for compliance with Rule 
23(b)(2). A supplemental inquiry, which would screen out putative classes 
seeking such relief, is needed. The next Part takes up that task. 
III. SUPPLEMENTING INDIVISIBILITY 
As noted previously, the text of Rule 23(b)(2) requires that the defendant “has 
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.”191 Root-cause indivisibility essentially asks whether the 
defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, 
so that the requested remedy is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.192 
What remains, then, is the requirement that the requested remedy involves “final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief.”193 Compliance with that 
requirement would address the due process concerns that the Supreme Court has 
expressed in connection with claims seeking only monetary relief.194 
 
190 This example is loosely based on Arriaga v. Members of Board of Regents, 825 F. Supp. 
1 (D. Mass. 1992). 
191 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  
192 The “so that . . . appropriate” language also presumes that the requested relief will 
actually relate to the root cause of the plaintiff’s injury; the plaintiff class cannot challenge 
the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct but seek an injunction or declaratory judgment 
wholly unrelated to that conduct. Id. Because it is hard to imagine a scenario in which those 
circumstances would satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement imposed by Rule 
23(a)(4), however, it seems more appropriate to treat this language as reflecting a background 
assumption rather than an independent requirement. 
193 Id. There has long been disagreement as to when and whether classes certified pursuant 
to Rule 23(b)(2) may seek monetary relief in addition to injunctive or declaratory relief. See 
Malveaux, supra note 118, at 364-65 (noting division among the federal circuit courts of 
appeals over the availability of monetary damages for Rule 23(b)(2) classes” in wake of Civil 
Rights Act of 1991). At the same time, however, there has been widespread agreement that 
injunctive or declaratory relief must be at least a part of the remedy sought. Id. at 365 (noting 
that “all of the circuits that considered the issue concluded that monetary relief was 
permissible so long as it did not predominate over the injunctive and declaratory relief 
sought”). 
194 See supra Section II.C (discussing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 
(1985)). Shutts held that in class actions “concerning claims wholly or predominately for 
money judgments,” due process requires notice and opt-out rights for absent class members. 
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A. Final Injunctive Relief or Corresponding Declaratory Relief 
One point bears emphasis at the outset: the question whether a plaintiff class 
seeks “final injunctive relief,” which brings the action within the realm of Rule 
23(b)(2), differs from the question whether a court should issue an injunction. 
While the remedial-stage inquiry asks whether the plaintiff has satisfied the 
requirements for obtaining injunctive relief,195 the certification-stage inquiry 
asks whether the remedy the plaintiff seeks is actually injunctive in nature. 
Similarly, the question whether a plaintiff class seeks “corresponding 
declaratory relief,” which also suffices to bring the action within the realm of 
Rule 23(b)(2), differs from the question whether a court should issue a 
declaratory judgment.196 
As discussed below, a plaintiff class seeks “final injunctive relief” within the 
meaning of Rule 23(b)(2) only if it seeks a non-provisional remedy that is 
directed at the prevention of future harm.197 Similarly, declaratory relief 
“correspond[s]” to final injunctive relief when its issuance would reflect that the 
putative class faces preventable future harm.198 
1. Characteristics of “Final Injunctive Relief” 
The question of whether a plaintiff seeks relief that is “final” within the 
meaning of Rule 23(b)(2) is relatively straightforward. Remedies such as 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders are provisional, in the 
sense that they are intended to last only for the duration of the litigation. By 
contrast, permanent injunctions are not provisional; while they are generally not 
expected to last forever (and thus are not “permanent” in a strictly literal 
sense),199 they do not automatically expire when the litigation ends. The “final” 
in “final injunctive relief” thus draws a distinction between permanent 
injunctions, on the one side, and provisional remedies, such as temporary 
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, on the other.200 A case that seeks 
 
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811 n.3. With regard to claims seeking both monetary and injunctive relief, 
see infra Section III.B. 
195 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (setting forth four-
part test for issuance of permanent injunctive relief). 
196 See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) 
(requiring “substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment”). 
197 See infra Section III.A.1 (discussing features of final injunctive relief). 
198 See infra Section III.A.2 (explaining meaning of corresponding declaratory relief). 
199 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5) (allowing court to dissolve injunction if “applying it 
prospectively is no longer equitable”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992) (discussing 
courts’ “inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way,” including by 
withdrawing or reducing judicial supervision); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 
367, 368 (1992) (interpreting Rule 60(b)(5) in context of motion to dissolve consent decree). 
200 See RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4:30.  
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no permanent injunction, but only temporary injunctive relief that the plaintiff 
does not seek to make permanent, will not fall under Rule 23(b)(2).201 
At first glance, the question whether a plaintiff seeks “injunctive relief” within 
the meaning of Rule 23(b)(2) might also seem like an easy one. After all, one 
might think that the court could simply read the complaint to determine whether 
the plaintiffs are requesting “[a] court order commanding or preventing an 
action.”202 Indeed, some prayers for relief are clearly injunctive in nature (e.g., 
issue a marriage license to this couple) and others are clearly not (e.g., pay a sum 
certain directly to this plaintiff). Between those two poles, however, things get 
murkier. For example, consider a tort plaintiff who wants to obtain medical care 
as a result of her lawsuit. If what she seeks is not cash, but an order requiring the 
defendant to pay for her care, it seems reasonable to conclude that she “cannot 
transform a claim for damages into injunctive relief simply by asking for an 
injunction that orders the payment of money.”203 But what if she asks for the 
defendant not just to pay for her medical care, but to provide it to her directly?204 
Does that request constitute “injunctive relief” as that phrase is used in Rule 
23(b)(2), because it involves an order to provide a service? Or does it constitute 
monetary relief in disguise, because it merely changes the circumstances under 
which the defendant writes the check?205 
At this point, it is worth pausing to ask why Rule 23 might treat injunctions 
and declaratory relief differently than pure demands for monetary damages, even 
in situations of root-cause indivisibility. In that regard, while either form of relief 
requires the plaintiff group to establish the unlawfulness of the defendant’s 
actual or threatened conduct, injunctive relief is broadly defendant-oriented, 
while monetary relief is broadly plaintiff-oriented. An injunction generally tells 
a defendant what he must (or must not) do in order to comply with the governing 
substantive law going forward; a monetary award generally tells a plaintiff what 
she will receive, based on the injuries she incurred in the past. These differences 
entail that injunctive relief can more directly and effectively benefit individuals 
within a class “whose members are incapable of specific enumeration,” as the 
 
201 Id. Courts have “[o]ccasionally . . . interpret[ed] what appears to be final injunctive 
relief as merely provisional” for purposes of Rule 23(b)(2). Id. For discussion and criticism 
of a Seventh Circuit case interpreting Rule 23(b)(2) in that manner, see infra note 223 and 
accompanying text. 
202 Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
203 Barraza v. C. R. Bard Inc., 332 F.R.D. 369, 387 (D. Ariz. 2017); Werlein v. United 
States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990) (“Payment of cash by one party to reimburse 
other parties for costs incurred is not injunctive relief.”), vacated in part on other grounds, 
793 F. Supp. 898, 900 (D. Minn. 1992).  
204 This question implicates medical monitoring. For a discussion of medical monitoring 
and Rule 23(b)(2), see infra Section III.C.  
205 Courts have struggled with this question. See RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra 
note 47, § 4:45. 
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drafters of the 1966 amendments put it.206 Individualized notice—which is not 
required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes at the certification stage—may be deemed less 
important when a court does not need to identify and locate individuals in order 
for them to benefit from the relief entered in their favor. Indeed, an injunction 
entered today can directly and effectively benefit individuals who will not even 
interact with the defendant until well into the future. 
Such future effects are not an incidental aspect of injunctive relief; to the 
contrary, courts and scholars have long recognized that injunctions are 
inherently prospective in nature.207 Because they provide prospective rather than 
retrospective relief, injunctions cannot provide redress “[f]or harm that has 
already happened, and for future harm that can no longer be prevented.”208 The 
law of standing reflects this essential feature of injunctive relief; in order to have 
standing to seek an injunction, a plaintiff must do more than allege harm that 
occurred entirely in the past.209 Rather, the plaintiff must allege a threat of future 
harm (instead of, or in addition to, past harm) that the requested injunction could 
prevent.210 
Although injunctions are prospective in nature, they may have corrective 
effects.211 Indeed, courts recognize that even reparative injunctions212—those 
designed to undo some or all of the damage caused by a defendant’s past 
violation—prevent harm in the future.213 For example, the Supreme Court held 
 
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)). 
By this statement I do not mean to suggest that all class actions for monetary relief must 
involve direct payments to class members. On the issue of cy pres remedies—which may not 
involve such payments—see Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the 
Debates over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 914 (2017). 
207 See, e.g., Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 883 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[I]njunctions 
regulate future conduct only; they do not provide relief for past injuries already incurred and 
over with.”). 
208 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 315 (5th ed. 
2018). 
209 See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct 
does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, . . . if 
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”). 
210 See id. at 498 (concluding that “threat of injury from the alleged course of conduct 
[plaintiffs] attack is simply too remote to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and 
permit adjudication by a federal court”); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
105 (1983) (“Lyons’ standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was 
likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers.”). 
211 See LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 208, at 312 (“All injunctions are preventive in the 
most fundamental sense; they seek to prevent harm from wrongful conduct. The distinction 
between preventive and reparative injunctions is between preventing the wrongful act . . . and 
preventing some or all of the harmful consequences of that act . . . .”). 
212 See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7-8 (1978) (introducing term 
“reparative injunction”). 
213 See, e.g., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 104 F.3d 
1349, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (deeming reparative injunction to be prospective for purposes of 
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in 1977 that an order requiring the establishment of educational programs as a 
remedy for prior school segregation was prospective in nature.214 The 
educational programs in question were “designed to wipe out continuing 
conditions of inequality produced by the inherently unequal dual school system 
long maintained by Detroit.”215 The programs would prevent harm to current 
and future public school students, rather than directly aiding the students who 
attended Detroit’s public schools in the past. As the Court explained, “[t]hat the 
programs are also ‘compensatory’ in nature does not change the fact that they 
are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits 
of a unitary school system.”216 
Courts have extensive experience differentiating between prospective and 
retrospective relief in the context of the Eleventh Amendment.217 That 
distinction does not turn on the terminology used by the parties or the court to 
describe the relief;218 nor does it turn on the monetary cost to the defendant of 
providing the relief or the monetary value to the plaintiff of receiving it. To the 
contrary, even if a remedy can be implemented only at great expense, it will be 
deemed prospective so long as it is not “tantamount to an award of damages for 
a past violation.”219 Thus, the key question is whether the remedy would 
compensate for harm that occurred entirely in the past, or whether it would 
instead prevent harm that still lies in the future. 
In the context of Rule 23(b)(2), some courts have implicitly or explicitly 
recognized the need for class members to seek relief directed at preventing future 
harm. Generally speaking, however, they have not identified that need as an 
essential feature of the “injunctive relief” referenced in the text of the rule. Some 
have shoehorned that analysis into the cohesiveness requirement that some 
courts have grafted onto Rule 23(b)(2),220 or the requirement that injunctive 
 
Eleventh Amendment analysis because it “would not serve as a remedy commensurate with 
damages for past wrongs. Instead, the injunction would serve to prevent what would allegedly 
be a continuing violation of the statute”). 
214 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against states, but state officials may be sued 
in their official capacities for relief that is prospective rather than retrospective in nature. See, 
e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (permitting prospective relief, but 
prohibiting retrospective relief, against state officials as matter of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity doctrine (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908))).  
218 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (“For Eleventh Amendment purposes, 
the line between permitted and prohibited suits will often be indistinct . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
219 Id. 
220 See, e.g., Abraham v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 321 F.R.D. 125, 177 (E.D. Pa. 
2017) (holding that cohesiveness was lacking because some class members did not face future 
harm that plaintiffs’ proposed remedy would address).  
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relief predominate over any incidental request for monetary relief.221 However, 
neither of those inquiries has any obvious connection to the question of whether 
the relevant harm lies in the future or entirely in the past. 
Other courts have deployed the “final” part of “final injunctive relief” as a 
bulwark against creatively disguised requests for damages. The Seventh Circuit, 
for example, stated in Kartman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance222 
that “[a]n injunction is not a final remedy if it would merely lay an evidentiary 
foundation for subsequent determinations of liability.”223 In that case, the 
plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, bad-faith denial of insurance benefits, and 
unjust enrichment based on allegations that the defendant company had 
underpaid on insurance claims for hail damage to their roofs.224 The district court 
denied certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class seeking damages, but granted 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking reinspection of policyholders’ roofs 
pursuant to a “uniform and objective standard.”225 The Seventh Circuit reversed, 
reasoning that the requested injunction was not “final” as required by Rule 
23(b)(2); rather, “[a] class-wide roof reinspection would only lay an evidentiary 
foundation for subsequent individual determinations of liability and 
damages.”226 
At best, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning stretches the word “final” well 
beyond its plain meaning of “not provisional”;227 at worst, it requires a 
subjective and unbounded inquiry into what the class members really want from 
the litigation. The court could have instead noted that the harm alleged by the 
class members (i.e., the hail damage and alleged underpayment) occurred 
entirely in the past; that the requested order thus could not be directed to the 
prevention of future harm; and that it therefore lacked a necessary characteristic 
of the “injunctive relief” contemplated by Rule 23(b)(2).228 This analysis would 
 
221 See, e.g., Maldonado v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 493 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Rule 23(b)(2) certification is also inappropriate when the majority of the class does not face 
future harm . . . . This situation leaves monetary claims for retrospective damages 
predominant in the case.” (citation omitted)); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 
978 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Most of the class consists of individuals who do not face further harm 
from [the defendant’s] actions. These plaintiffs have nothing to gain from an injunction, and 
the declaratory relief they seek serves only to facilitate the award of damages. Thus, the 
definition of the class shows that most of the plaintiffs are seeking only damages.”).  
222 634 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011). 
223 Id. at 893. 
224 Id. at 885-86. 
225 Id. at 886. 
226 Id. 
227 Cf. RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4:30 (noting that reinspection 
order requested by the Kartman plaintiffs “would have been part of their final relief”).  
228 Indeed, in distinguishing a case relied upon by the plaintiffs, the court implicitly 
recognized that the prospective relief that is appropriate for a Rule 23(b)(2) class requires an 
alleged threat of future harm: 
Unlike this case, . . . the remedies sought by the Allen plaintiffs were designed to cure 
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have the advantage of greater ease of application and a firmer connection to the 
language of the rule.229 
Two caveats are in order. First, the requirement that the requested relief be 
directed at the prevention of future harm should not be used as an excuse to jump 
ahead to the merits stage of the case. Requiring proof that plaintiffs actually face 
a threat of future harm, and not merely that they seek to prevent such harm, could 
increase the plaintiff’s evidentiary burdens prematurely.230 Second, this 
prospectiveness requirement would interact poorly with a strict ascertainability 
standard.231 The latter would prevent certification of classes in which claimants 
will face harm in the future, but cannot be individually identified in the present—
for example, because they have not yet enrolled in the defendant high school, 
been imprisoned in the defendant correctional facility, or gone to work for the 
defendant employer.232 Some courts have rejected ascertainability as a 
requirement for class certification, and those that have adopted a strict version 
of it have generally recognized that it should not apply to classes certified under 
 
two distinct injuries: past and future discrimination. Monetary damages, if awarded, 
would compensate the employees for the discrimination they had already suffered; 
damages would provide a final retrospective remedy for that injury. An injunction, on 
the other hand, would require the employer to cease its discriminatory conduct, providing 
a final prospective remedy for ongoing and future discrimination. Here, in contrast, the 
plaintiffs have suffered only one cognizable injury—[the defendant’s] alleged 
underpayment of their hail-damage claims—and a retrospective damages remedy would 
provide final, adequate relief for this singular harm. 
Kartman, 634 F.3d at 894 (emphasis omitted) (discussing Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 
358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
229 In addition, as with the interaction between commonality and root-cause indivisibility, 
see supra Section II.B.2, the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief could 
help to illuminate the appropriate boundaries of a particular Rule 23(b)(2) class. See Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 364-65 (2011) (implying that Rule 23(b)(2) class 
should include only those who have “need for prospective relief”); Donegan v. Norwood, No. 
1:16-cv-11178, 2017 WL 6569634, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2017) (excluding, from 23(b)(2) 
class seeking changes to state benefits program, individuals who are not currently enrolled in 
that program).  
230 See In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., 321 F.R.D. 64, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (denying 
certification because “[p]laintiffs have proffered no evidence that [d]efendants are currently 
engaging in anticompetitive conduct or that there is a risk to the class of future harm”).  
231 The strict version of ascertainability requires “not just that the class itself be defined 
clearly, but also that individuals be identifiable as members of the class in a reliable and 
administratively feasible way.” Bone, supra note 206, at 914.  
232 See id. at 960 (“[C]onsider a (b)(2) class action alleging racial discrimination against 
African-American employees . . . . [I]n theory at least, an injunction would still make sense 
even if all current employees happened to quit at the time the injunction was entered and a 
new set of employees was hired—since the target is the group and that group includes new as 
well as current employees.”).  
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Rule 23(b)(2).233 If that were to change, the requirement proposed here would 
put plaintiffs between a prospectiveness rock and an ascertainability hard place. 
2. Characteristics of “Corresponding Declaratory Relief” 
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes a court to “declare the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,” provided 
that there exists an “actual controversy” between the parties.234 A plaintiff may 
seek declaratory relief in a range of circumstances in which the parties to a 
potential lawsuit face legal uncertainty, regardless of whether that potential suit 
would include a request for damages, an injunction, or some other form of relief. 
For example, a patent-holder might believe that a licensee will owe it royalties 
from future sales of a product, while the licensee may disagree because it 
believes the underlying patent to be invalid and unenforceable.235 In those 
circumstances, the licensee may be able to bring a declaratory judgment action 
to determine the patent’s validity before the dispute ripens into a claim for 
damages or injunctive relief.236 
Not all of the circumstances in which a plaintiff can seek declaratory relief, 
however, will involve a request for “corresponding declaratory relief” within the 
meaning of Rule 23(b)(2).237 If that were the case, any group of plaintiffs could 
transform a claim for damages that would not fall under Rule 23(b)(2) (e.g., “we 
seek damages because the defendant breached our contract”) into a claim for 
declaratory relief that would (e.g., “we seek a declaration that the defendant 
breached our contract”).238 Rather, as the drafters of Rule 23(b)(2) put it, 
“[d]eclaratory relief ‘corresponds’ to injunctive relief when as a practical matter 
it affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive relief.”239 
 
233 See id. at 929 (“[E]ven the Third Circuit, the strongest proponent of a strict 
ascertainability rule, declines to apply it to class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2).” (citing 
Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559-63 (3d Cir. 2015))).  
234 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2018). 
235 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121-22 (2007) (“Petitioner did 
not think royalties were owing, believing that the . . . patent was invalid and unenforceable.”). 
236 Id. at 136 (“The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a court ‘may declare the rights 
and other legal relations of any interested party’ . . . . We leave the equitable, prudential, and 
policy arguments in favor of such a discretionary dismissal for the lower courts’ consideration 
on remand.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). 
237 See Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose” Implications of the History of 
the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 792 (2006) (“The 
term ‘corresponding declaratory relief’ in the Rule suggests that only a subset of declaratory 
judgment actions that may be viable in one-on-one litigation may be maintainable in a class 
action certified under Rule 23(b)(2).”). 
238 RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4:31 (“In short, declaratory relief 
under (b)(2) cannot simply turn a (b)(3) damages action into an action under (b)(2).”). 
239 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)). 
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Presumably, the phrase about declaratory relief “as a practical 
matter . . . afford[ing] injunctive relief” refers to a situation in which a defendant 
changes its behavior to comply with the legal interpretation set forth in the 
declaratory judgment.240 On the flip side, declaratory relief would “serve[] as a 
basis for later injunctive relief” if the defendant failed to change its behavior in 
that manner, prompting the plaintiff to seek injunctive relief to secure 
compliance. Either scenario is possible only if the defendant has not already 
permanently changed its behavior, prior to the issuance of the declaratory relief; 
that is, if the plaintiff faces a risk of future harm that an injunction could 
prevent.241 
Accordingly, the question whether a putative class seeks “corresponding 
declaratory relief” under Rule 23(b)(2) essentially boils down to the same 
question about the prevention of future harm discussed above242: declaratory 
relief “correspond[s]” to injunctive relief when it targets a defendant’s conduct 
that exposes a plaintiff class to preventable future harm.243 
B. Incidental Retrospective Relief? 
If the putative class does not seek any relief that meets the requirements set 
forth above—i.e., relief that meets the root-cause indivisibility standard and is 
directed at the prevention of future harm—then the inquiry ends there, and the 
class action may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). In many cases, however, 
a plaintiff class seeks some relief that meets those requirements and some relief 
that does not. This latter category of “incidental” retrospective relief (usually 
involving monetary damages) has caused courts and scholars great consternation 
over the last several decades.244 
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court declined to decide 
whether Rule 23(b)(2) allows for any form of incidental retrospective relief.245 
 
240 See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 
1108 (2014) (noting that “most common scenarios for federal plaintiffs to seek a declaratory 
judgment” present “no need for a command” because “[a]fter the declaratory judgment, 
everyone knows what to do”). 
241 Id. at 1095 (“When used prospectively, [injunctions and declaratory judgments] are 
rough substitutes, and in many cases they have the same effect.” (emphasis added)).  
242 See supra Section III.A.1 (discussing characteristics of final injunctive relief).  
243 Some courts have expressed a similar idea in the form of a requirement that declaratory 
relief not merely “lay the basis for a later damage award.” See, e.g., Sarafin v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 446 F. Supp. 611, 615 (N.D. Ill. 1978). This approach leads courts to try to determine 
the “real goal” of the litigation. See id. Thus, it suffers from some of the same drawbacks 
discussed in supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing Kartman v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
244 See RUBENSTEIN, CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 47, § 4.37. I use “retrospective” here, 
rather than “monetary,” because that term more fully encompasses the range of relief that 
could be pursued alongside a qualifying request for an injunction or declaratory judgment. 
245 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366 (2011) (“We need not decide 
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It would be plausible to conclude that it does not, as the text refers only to 
injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief, and the historical models for the 
provision did not involve requests for retrospective remedies.246 The Advisory 
Committee note to the 1966 amendments, however, strongly implies that such 
remedies are permissible; it states that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not extend to cases 
in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to 
money damages.”247 With regard to this statement, the Court wrote in Dukes that 
“a mere negative inference” would not lead it to grant the plaintiffs’ request to 
seek back pay through a Rule 23(b)(2) class, because such a result “has no basis 
in the Rule’s text, and . . . does obvious violence to the Rule’s structural 
features.”248 
The question remains, then, whether the Court would deem there to be any 
forms of incidental retrospective relief that would not do violence to the structure 
of Rule 23—or, for that matter, to the due process rights of absent class 
members.249That question is ultimately beyond the scope of this Article, which 
takes no position on whether retrospective relief that satisfies a root-cause 
indivisibility requirement would (or should) be deemed permissible. This Article 
notes only that if there is to be any remaining role for cohesiveness,250 it must 
be here—in situations of incidental monetary or other retrospective relief—and 
not in situations of purely injunctive or declaratory relief, which are fully 
addressed by the standard set forth above. 
 
in this case whether there are any forms of ‘incidental’ monetary relief that are consistent with 
the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we have announced and that comply with the Due Process 
Clause.”). 
246 Id. at 360-61 (“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory 
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. . . . [I]t does not authorize class 
certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of 
monetary damages.”). 
247 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (Subdivision (b)(2)) 
(emphasis added). The implication of this statement is that non-predominating requests for 
monetary relief are sometimes permissible. See Bone, supra note 47, at 702 n.217 (“There 
would have been no need to mention this limitation if Rule 23(b)(2) were intended only for 
injunctive and declaratory relief.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions at the Crossroads: 
An Answer to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 378 (2011) (“This language 
makes clear that the drafters did not intend to ban all forms of monetary relief, but only a 
small subset—exclusive or predominant damages.” (emphasis omitted)). 
248 Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363. On the proper weight to be accorded the Advisory Committee 
notes in the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2), see Malveaux, supra note 247, at 385-87. 
249 Cf. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363 (“In the context of a class action predominantly for money 
damages we have held that absence of notice and opt out violates due process. While we have 
never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the serious possibility 
that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the 
monetary claims here.” (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985))). 
250 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing whether cohesiveness has 
continued relevance Rule 23(b)(2) or if it has been subsumed by indivisibility).  
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C. Examples and Implications 
Putting together all of the pieces of the foregoing discussion results in the 
following test for compliance with Rule 23(b)(2): the plaintiffs must seek relief 
that (i) satisfies the root-cause indivisibility requirement; (ii) is permanent, as 
opposed to being intended to last only for the duration of the litigation; and, (iii) 
is prospective, in the sense of being directed to the prevention of future harm 
rather than solely being directed to compensation for past harm. 
This test brings greater clarity to some of the questions about Rule 23(b)(2) 
with which courts have struggled. For example, consider medical monitoring 
claims, in which plaintiffs exposed to toxic substances seek to have the 
defendant create or fund a program to identify any illnesses that may manifest 
because of the exposure. A court could rule a defendant’s conduct toward a 
plaintiff in such a case unlawful—for example, because the defendant 
wrongfully exposed the plaintiff to a toxic substance in amounts sufficient to 
increase the plaintiff’s risk of particular illnesses—without ruling the 
defendant’s conduct unlawful as to anyone else. Accordingly, a group of such 
claimants would not satisfy a root-cause indivisibility requirement. Moreover, 
the requested relief would not be directed at the prevention of future harm, but 
only at the detection of any future harm that may occur.251 
As another example, consider a city that operates a civil forfeiture program,252 
the proceeds of which are shared between the district attorney’s office and the 
police department.253 Plaintiffs file a lawsuit alleging that the revenue-sharing 
agreement creates a structural conflict of interest that renders the entire program 
unconstitutional. Because the agreement either does or does not render the 
program unconstitutional, a successful challenge to the future operation of the 
program would require the court to rule on its constitutionality, and plaintiffs 
seeking such an injunction would satisfy a root-cause indivisibility requirement. 
But what if the plaintiffs also seek to recover the property seized from them—
which includes both fungible goods, like cash, and potentially unique goods, like 
jewelry? As to the plaintiffs seeking recovery of fungible goods, the requested 
order would not be directed at the prevention of future harm, but rather to 
compensation for past harm.254 As to the remaining plaintiffs, ongoing 
 
251 In some circumstances, early detection of an illness can prevent some of the harm the 
illness might otherwise cause. Even in those circumstances, however, medical monitoring 
would likely be “tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation . . . ” Papasan v. 
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). That is because an award of damages would enable the 
claimant to obtain the necessary medical services just as well as (if not better than) a medical 
monitoring program would. 
252 Civil forfeiture refers to “[a]n in rem proceeding brought by the government against 
property that either facilitated a crime or was acquired as a result of criminal activity.” Civil 
Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
253 This example is loosely based on Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.R.D. 12, 17 
(E.D. Pa. 2017).  
254 Indeed, part of the settlement in the actual case on which this hypothetical is based 
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separation from one’s unique property can constitute future harm (in a way that 
ongoing separation from one’s money cannot), but that harm will be preventable 
only with regard to property that remains in the defendants’ possession. The test 
proposed here would thus narrow the appropriate scope of a Rule 23(b)(2) class 
seeking restitution to those whose unique property was seized and remains in the 
defendants’ possession. 
Finally, consider a case in which plaintiffs allege that a county conducted an 
election for justice of the peace in a racially discriminatory manner—for 
example, by maintaining separate voter lists and separate voting booths for white 
and African American voters.255 Assume that the plaintiffs request certification 
of a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking to have the election results set aside and a new 
election conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner. The situation is one of root-
cause indivisibility, because any claimant’s successful request for such an order 
would require a determination of the initial election’s lawfulness.256 Moreover, 
though prompted by a violation that occurred in the past, the requested order 
would also be directed at the prevention of future harm—specifically, the harm 
of subjecting the class members to the authority of an unlawfully elected official. 
Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) would be satisfied in that 
scenario as well. 
CONCLUSION 
More than a half century after Rule 23(b)(2) took effect, fundamental 
questions about its application remain. This Article has aimed to provide a 
framework for answering those questions in a manner that promotes consistency 
in class certification decisions, respects the due process rights of absent class 
members, and maintains fidelity to the text and history of Rule 23(b)(2). 
Specifically, the rule should be understood to require root-cause indivisibility,257 
permanence,258 and prospectiveness.259 Putative classes that meet those 
requirements should be certified, so long as the prerequisites set forth in Rule 
23(a) are satisfied as well; an endpoint indivisibility requirement should not be 
imposed.  
 
involved creation of a three million dollar fund to compensate those affected by the city’s 
forfeiture practices. See P.J. D’Annunzio, City to Roll Back Civil Forfeiture and Compensate 
Philadelphians Affected by It, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 18, 2018, 12:38 PM), 
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2018/09/18/city-to-roll-back-civil-forfeiture-and-
compensate-philadelphians-affected-by-it/ (“The city of Philadelphia has agreed to stop 
allowing law enforcement to profit from civil forfeiture . . . [and] has also agreed to set up a 
$3 million fund to compensate those affected by it.”). 
255 This example is based on Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1967).  
256 The plaintiff group would also satisfy an endpoint indivisibility requirement, because 
a county cannot both conduct and not conduct an election for a particular position.  
257 See supra Section II.B.3. 
258 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra Section III.A. 
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The push for an endpoint indivisibility requirement under Rule 23(b)(2) 
appears to be on a collision course with case law permitting “national 
injunctions” and similarly broad injunctive relief in non-class cases.260 (I refer 
here to injunctions that constrain the defendant’s behavior with respect to 
nonparties, not just the named plaintiffs, even though no class has been 
certified). As Professor Samuel Bray has recently explained, the doctrine 
governing national injunctions and similar non-class relief is “a muddle of 
inconsistent generalizations.”261 
Because of the confusion surrounding both Rule 23(b)(2) and the national 
injunction, a plaintiff seeking broad injunctive relief faces a difficult choice: 
should she seek class treatment, knowing that if certification is denied, the court 
may be unlikely to order injunctive relief as broad as the class it refused to 
certify?262 Or should she instead avoid any mention of class treatment, hoping 
that the court will decide that broad injunctive relief is appropriate anyway? The 
latter option may become less available—or may even cease to exist—as courts, 
scholars, and lawmakers begin to devote more attention to the question of the 
national injunction.263 In any event, a functional version of Rule 23 would make 
 
260 See Bray, supra note 86, at 456 (discussing availability of injunctive relief that affects 
defendants’ behavior toward non-parties); Carroll, supra note 6, at 2030-34 (same); Marcus, 
supra note 16, at 801-02, 802 n.163 (same). 
261 Bray, supra note 86, at 465; see also Carroll, supra note 6, at 2032 (noting that “courts 
have articulated conflicting rules and holdings when deciding whether a plaintiff can obtain 
system-wide relief without bringing a class action”).  
262 Indeed, the denial of class certification may result in the dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
individual case as well. See Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., No. 2:01-cv-00928, 
2012 WL 3600231, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2012) (dismissing individual actions, on remand 
from reversal of class certification, because “[n]one of the plaintiffs exhausted their 
administrative remedies, and the exception [to the administrative exhaustion requirement] for 
systemic violations is essentially a ‘class action exception’” (citation omitted)). 
263 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I 
am skeptical that district courts have the authority to enter universal injunctions. . . . [Such 
injunctions] appear to be inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the 
power of Article III courts.”). City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(“We are cognizant of the possible hazards of the use of nationwide injunctions . . . . [They] 
should be utilized only in rare circumstances.” (citations omitted)); Injunctive Authority 
Clarification Act of 2018, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018) (“No court of the United 
States . . . shall issue an order that purports to restrain the enforcement against a non-
party . . . unless the non-party is represented by a party acting in a representive 
capacity . . . .”); Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and 
Nationwide Harm, 131 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 49, 51-55 (2017); Bray, supra note 86, at 419; 
Carroll, supra note 6, at 2075-83; Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1067-69 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and 
the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 56, 62 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide 
Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2098 (2017); Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges 
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the former choice the better one.264 That version of Rule 23(b)(2) still exists, and 
so long as courts apply an appropriate understanding of indivisibility, plaintiffs 
need not shy away from it. 
 
 
264 See generally Carroll, supra note 6.  
